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AGAINST CRIMINAL LAW LOCALISM
BRENNER M. FISSELL*
Scholars have long called for greater localism in criminal justice as a
response to the crises of racialized mass incarceration and over-policing. A
downward shift of power to smaller local governments is thought to maximize
an array of values, including liberty, equality, and efficient experimentation,
and also to allow for criminal justice to better reflect societal viewpoints. In
making these claims, localists have at times either explicitly included control
over substantive criminal law in their devolutionary project, or have
overlooked that more general calls for localism would presumably include
this power.
This Article critiques substantive criminal law localism, arguing that it
counteracts the values that the localist project aims to achieve. Because of
foundational features of local government law, localities have no authority
to decriminalize conduct criminalized by a state—their option is only to add
more offenses to the existing state code. Increased localism in substantive
criminal law, then, functions as a one-way ratchet for more misdemeanor
criminalization and all its attendant ills: incarceration, crippling fines and
fees, and the authorization of more policing, surveillance, and managerial
social control of marginalized groups. Criminal justice localists should
therefore excise substantive criminal law from their devolutionary program,
and they should do so explicitly.
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INTRODUCTION
For the past two decades, one theme in criminal justice scholarship has
remained constant: localism. Nearly every prominent reformist voice agrees
that more power should be devolved to smaller jurisdictions when possible,
and the smaller the better. First was the intellectual reaction to the Supreme
Court’s decision in City of Chicago v. Morales1 in 1999. The Court struck
down a Chicago gang-loitering ordinance as void-for-vagueness,2 but many
academics uncharacteristically recoiled at this pro-defendant result. The rise
of a “New Discretion” literature criticized paternalistic judges in far-off
marble halls who, in the name of abstract civil rights and liberties, invalidated
policy decisions made by local citizens on the ground—especially those
made by urban minority citizens who were most affected by crime.3 Fast
forward about one decade, and William Stuntz would advance the following
thesis: “Make criminal justice more locally democratic, and justice will be
both more moderate and more egalitarian.”4 Today, this localism remains
alive and well in the prominent movement to “democratize” criminal justice,5
and also in a newly burgeoning scholarship critiquing the misdemeanor
system.6

1. 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
2. Id. at 51.
3. See, e.g., David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New
Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059 (1999); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The
Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1161–63 (1998).
4. William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1974 (2008).
5. See generally Joshua Kleinfeld et al., White Paper of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111
NW. U. L. REV. 1693 (2017).
6. See, e.g., ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE
MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL (2018).
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These scholars, writing in response to the contemporary crises of
racialized mass incarceration and over-policing, argue that localism can work
to enhance a number of values. By more closely mapping jurisdictional
boundaries around communities with shared moral viewpoints, localism
facilitates greater instantiation of those values into law.7 By empowering the
community, localism empowers more empathy for fellow citizens, thus
resulting in more lenient punishment (and greater individual liberty) as well
as more egalitarian outcomes. Finally, localism enables experimentation in
policymaking, with the expectation of long-term benefits.
In this Article, I argue that the localist project in criminal justice must
make a narrower claim for devolution if the project is to cohere: It must
abandon calls for devolution over substantive criminal law. Fundamental
principles of local government law—enshrined in state constitutions and their
judicial interpretations—deprive localities of the power to decriminalize
conduct that is punished under state law. Local governments are creatures of
state law, and thus have no authority to repeal state offenses. Moreover,
prevailing preemption doctrines enforce this inferior status, reducing the
sphere of permissible local regulation to the creation of new offenses that
cover more conduct than that covered by state law. Put bluntly, localities can
add to criminal law, but they cannot subtract from it. The example of
marijuana possession in Sarasota, Florida, is illustrative. The city recently
“decriminalized” this conduct with much fanfare, but in reality it was merely
repealing its own pre-existing local crime, and the analogous state law
offense continues to be enforced even within the city limits.8
Localism in substantive criminal law is therefore a “one-way ratchet”—
it has a necessarily pro-criminalization valence. While it is conceivable that
more speculative theorists could call for a world where localities do have the
power to entirely determine the content of the criminal law within their
jurisdictional boundaries, the localists engaged with here are pragmatic.
Their reforms are expected to be reasonably possible given the current
structure of state and federal constitutional law. This is part of the attraction
of localism: It is a pre-existing system that can be utilized for an expected
benefit. The point I hope to make is that the existing structure will not result
in a criminal law localism that will produce the benefits localists expect.
More criminal law localism can only mean more local criminalization, which
means more misdemeanors and their well-recognized pathologies: more
incarceration, fines, and fees, and the authorization of more managerial social
control,9 policing, and surveillance of marginalized groups. Criminal law
7. See infra Part I.
8. See infra Section II.C.
9. A “managerial model” of social control, according to sociologist Issa Kohler-Hausmann
includes (1) an aim of “marking” defendants by putting arrests and convictions on their records so
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localism thus threatens the very values that criminal justice localists hope to
maximize.
First, consider the expectation that localism will better permit different
concentrations of criminal justice policy viewpoints to make their way into
law. Localism could enable moral diversity.10 Reducing jurisdictional size,
when coupled with a concentrated group of likeminded people, is thought to
create electoral majorities that would not exist at the state level. This all
sounds good when thinking about many different categories of policies (say,
zoning), but it turns potentially sinister when applied to criminal punishment.
Moral diversity localism, by devolving for the purpose of concentrating
viewpoints in criminal law, carries with it the classic threat of minority
oppression. Mainstream theories of punishment, such as liberalism or the
increasingly popular republicanism, would reject this institutional shift. It
would facilitate increased restrictions on autonomy by reducing the barriers
to consensus that larger, more heterogeneous communities provide.11
Second, localism in criminalization would counteract another benefit
that localism is supposed to provide: the maximization of individual liberty.
The liberty payoff in localism, according to some criminal justice localists,
comes from the increased empathy that citizens have with respect to those
they live alongside.12 This is supposed to result in more lenient criminal
justice outcomes. The claim of expected leniency is psychological, though,
and has been criticized.13 With respect to substantive criminal law,

that they could be tracked and later controlled; (2) putting up “procedure hassle[s]” to test the “ruleabiding propensities” of the marked individuals (e.g., appearing in court); and (3) “performance” in
place of a sentence, meaning “the set of activities the defendant is instructed by the court or
prosecutor to undertake” such as drug treatment (also aimed at testing rule-abidingness). ISSA
KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE
OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 20–21 (2018). Even if incarceration is not a sanction actually
meted out for many local offenses, although it is very often authorized, see Brenner M. Fissell,
Local Offenses, 89 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 854–56 (2020), the resultant “marking” and “procedure
hassle” of a conviction can have serious implications for the person’s life. Of course, the
criminalization of the conduct also licenses police to interfere in citizens’ lives through the
triggering of criminal procedure investigative powers. See Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal
Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409, 1442 (2001) (explaining that the arrest and
search for the trivial local offense can serve “as “an investigative fulcrum to increase criminal
liability (sometimes radically)”).
10. See Stephanos Bibas, Small Crimes, Big Injustices, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1025, 1041 (2019)
(“Some communities prize orderly public spaces and are willing to trade away more liberty. Others
are more relaxed about social disorder and disruption. The genius of American federalism (and
localism) is that the police and prosecutors in each community can calibrate the level of enforcement
to their communities.”).
11. And if some localists would be willing to abandon liberalism or republicanism, they would
find themselves outside of mainstream criminal law theory. See infra Section III.A.
12. Kahan & Meares, supra note 3, at 1163.
13. See John Rappaport, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI. L.
REV. 711, 786–91 (2020).
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moreover, most people would think that more local power to prohibit and
punish more conduct—and for localities the only option is “more”—means
less individual liberty to engage in the conduct. Liberty is also inhibited by
the policing and surveillance apparatus that is authorized by criminalization.
Some criminal justice localists avoid this conclusion by embracing a
counterintuitive notion of liberty as freedom from oppressive social norms
(that might be erased through new criminal offenses),14 but we should resist
this reframing of a fundamental concept due to a small category of outlier
cases: Liberty in the context of criminal justice reform is liberty from the
state, not from private actors.
Third, criminal justice localists hope that localism can advance
equality—especially racial equality, given the American phenomenon of
racially disparate mass incarceration.15 Equality, for the localists, is a benefit
that runs in tandem with liberty (or leniency) and moral diversity. Smaller
jurisdictions, as empathy enablers, will result in fewer punitive outcomes for
historically marginalized groups; these jurisdictions, if given more power,
will act to effectuate pro-leniency policy preferences that historically had
been subordinated. Again, though, the claim of an expected increase in
empathy and leniency is contestable, and in the context of substantive
criminal law it is difficult to imagine how power-shifting to localities—given
the constraints of local government law—will help to equalize anything. If
the only option for localities is to create more misdemeanors, then their only
option for equalizing the playing field is to “level up”—to create new
offenses that punish conduct engaged in by historically dominant groups.
Equality through increased punishment, though, counteracts the decarceral
goals of criminal justice localists. It brings equality at the expense of
leniency.
Finally, some criminal justice localists deploy a famous argument for
devolution: A multitude of smaller jurisdictions will serve as “laboratories of
experimentation,” with an expected benefit of more efficient policymaking
in the long run.16 Like with moral diversity localism, this may seem like a
valuable effect of devolution when making taxation or zoning policy. When
one considers its application to substantive criminal law, though, the result is
the unsavory claim that localities should experiment with punishing their
citizens. Experimentation localism relies on an expectation of tentativeness
in enacted laws, and almost no theory of state punishment would accept
tentative punishment as legitimate. Citizens are not lab rats, and failed
14. See infra Section I.A.
15. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1974; Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power
Lens, 130 YALE L.J. 778, 787 (2021).
16. See, e.g., K. Sabeel Rahman & Jocelyn Simonson, The Institutional Design of Community
Control, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 679, 733–34 (2020); NATAPOFF, supra note 6, at 226–27.
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criminal law policies leave too much destruction in their wake to be
contemplated on an experimental basis.
While I argue that criminal law localism should be rejected for these
reasons, I leave open the possibility of a criminal procedure localism—
especially with respect to the policing, investigation, and prosecution of
crime—that will maximize the central values of the localist project. The full
explication of this claim goes beyond the scope of this Article. Here, I briefly
flag for future analysis two reasons why one might view procedural
devolution differently: (1) the ability of localities to “subtract” in many areas
of criminal procedure (because of an absence of state law on the subject),17
and (2) the target of the rules regarding procedure (officials, and not
citizens).18 These distinctions together make it at least possible for the values
cherished by localists to be maximized by procedural devolution, and recent
reforms demonstrate this potential.19 However, we must be cautious,
realizing that some of the pathologies identified in the analysis of local
criminalization may be equally at work in local control over criminal

17. Localities do not usually operate as a one-way rachet with respect to criminal procedure.
Policing and prosecution is almost wholly delegated to local governments, Rachel A. Harmon,
Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 870, 876–77 (2015) (police);
Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the States, 109
MICH. L. REV. 519, 545 (2011) (prosecutors), and state law does not usually regulate these officials
with a comprehensive code—at least not anything like one observes in substantive criminal law.
This state law vacuum means that localities become rachets than can work either way. Rules
covering law enforcement can be created or abolished, depending on the preferences of the local
jurisdiction. This is not true, though, in areas of procedural law where there is a somewhat
comprehensive state and federal floor (especially Fourth Amendment law and its state analogues).
18. Local innovation in procedure results in restraints on official discretion and not on citizens’
freedom. “[C]onstitutional criminal procedure is a species of substantive criminal law for cops.”
Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two
Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2470 (1996). When localities create rules that constrain official
power, this has the effect of increasing individual (citizen) liberty—in other words, it maximizes
freedom and dignity by taking away the ability to exercise official power arbitrarily.
19. Take, for example, the City of Minneapolis’s ban on police chokeholds following the killing
of George Floyd—a decision hailed as working to reduce the racially disparate impact of deadly
police practices. See Steve Karnowski, Minneapolis Bans Police Chokeholds in Wake of Floyd’s
Death, AP NEWS (June 5, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/ce3c4c56b683ae47d26bec1045a35fb7.
Local law built on the state and federal floors that permitted chokeholds, reducing police discretion
to use the maneuver. Local prosecutorial declination policies regarding minor offenses have similar
potential. See Justin Murray, Prosecutorial Nonenforcement and Residual Criminalization 4 (Feb.
21, 2022) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4040302
(“Supporters [of declination policies] . . . assert that a DA’s responsibility is to seek justice through
the sound exercise of discretion or to carry out the local electorate’s will and thus that prosecutors
should decline to enforce laws that are unjust or at odds with the local community’s needs.”).
Finally, consider New York City’s local ban on racial profiling in policing (which is federally
permitted under Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)). Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of
N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.S.3d 314, 316 (App. Div. 2016). There, the City imposed
additional duties beyond what superior jurisdictions had imposed, resulting in enhanced
egalitarianism in policing.
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procedure. This ambivalence reflects the “dilemma of localism”—the effect
of empowering smaller communities will depend on the nature of the
community and the decisions it makes.20 But whatever one may say about
the potential of criminal procedure localism, I argue that substantive criminal
law localism will necessarily have effects that undermine the values of the
localist project, and that it should therefore be abandoned.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I traces the intellectual history of
criminal justice localism since the Morales decision, beginning with the work
of Tracey Meares and Daniel Kahan, and ending with the recent scholarship
on misdemeanors by Alexandra Natapoff. Part II introduces a crucial
premise about American local government law that functions as an obstacle
to expected benefits of devolution in the realm of substantive criminal law:
Localities can criminalize, but they cannot decriminalize. Part III applies this
premise critically to claims regarding the values of localism, including claims
about maximizing liberty, equality, and efficiency (through
experimentation), as well as the notion that local law will better reflect
concentrated policy preferences.
I. CRIMINAL JUSTICE LOCALISM: A TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
Criminal justice scholars, following the lead of the Supreme Court,21
have long favored localism and devolution of power. This Part will chronicle
a twenty-year intellectual history of the most prominent voices in this
tradition.22

20. See generally Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of Polarization,
128 YALE L.J. 954 (2019).
21. The Supreme Court has been explicitly pro-devolution when deciding criminal justice
issues. While the devolution normally lauded by the Court is that from federal to state governments,
many federalism arguments also justify localism. The most famous example of this in criminal
justice is Powell v. Texas, a 1968 case upholding a public intoxication statute against constitutional
challenge. 392 U.S. 514 (1968). The defendant argued that the statute violated the rule against
status offenses announced in the earlier case Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Powell,
392 U.S. at 532. In rejecting this argument, the Court referenced the complexity of criminal justice
matters and the resultant need for the “process of adjustment” in the doctrine to take place amongst
the states. Id. at 535–36. As an example, the Court pointed to the difficulty in creating a uniform
definition of insanity: “[F]ormulating a constitutional rule would reduce, if not eliminate . . . fruitful
experimentation, and freeze the developing productive dialogue between law and psychiatry into a
rigid constitutional mold.” Id. at 536–37. Pro-devolution themes continue throughout the ensuing
decades of opinions, often in service of a pattern of resistance toward the imposition of nationwide
constitutional rules in criminal law. For a lengthy treatment, see generally Brenner M. Fissell,
Federalism and Constitutional Criminal Law, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 489, 501 (2017).
22. In a recent piece, Alexandra Natapoff chronicles a similar history. Alexandra Natapoff,
Criminal Municipal Courts, 134 HARV. L. REV. 964, 1029–33 (2021) (describing “criminal
localism debate” by citing to Stuntz and the democratization symposium, as well as scholarly
reactions to Morales, including Kahan and Meares).
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A. The Backlash to Morales and Judicial Paternalism
We can begin with the work of Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares around
the start of the twenty-first century. The context of Kahan and Meares’
intervention is the litigation surrounding the City of Chicago’s “Gang
Congregation Ordinance.”23 In an attempt to reduce the menacing loitering
of “criminal street gangs” in the city, Chicago promulgated an ordinance
targeting the behavior.24 It was struck down as void-for-vagueness by the
U.S. Supreme Court in the famous case of City of Chicago v. Morales.25 For
Kahan and Meares, the Chicago ordinance issue was emblematic of a larger
“coming crisis in criminal procedure.”26 The Warren Court’s constitutional
rules (such as the vagueness doctrine) were created during an era in which
Black urban residents were politically powerless and needed protection. By
the 1990s, however, Black urban residents were in control of their localities
and were attempting to use criminal law to solve problems in their
communities.27 Thus, “[a] body of doctrine designed to assure racial equality
in law enforcement has now become an impediment to minority
communities’ own efforts to liberate themselves from rampant crime.”28
“Ironically,” Kahan and Meares write, “the Warren Court’s doctrines are now
being used to frustrate minority communities’ own efforts to remedy the
effects of the one feature of institutionalized racism that the Warren Court
itself was powerless to attack—namely, the discriminatory under23. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 57 (1999).
24. Id. at 46 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 58 (Ill. 1997)).
The ordinance creates a criminal offense punishable by a fine of up to $500,
imprisonment for not more than six months, and a requirement to perform up to 120 hours
of community service. Commission of the offense involves four predicates. First, the
police officer must reasonably believe that at least one of the two or more persons present
in a “public place” is a “criminal street gang membe[r].” Second, the persons must be
“loitering,” which the ordinance defines as “remain[ing] in any one place with no
apparent purpose.” Third, the officer must then order “all” of the persons to disperse and
remove themselves “from the area.” Fourth, a person must disobey the officer’s order.
If any person, whether a gang member or not, disobeys the officer’s order, that person is
guilty of violating the ordinance.
Id. at 47 (alteration in original) (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 58 (Ill. 1997)).
25. Id. at 51.
26. Kahan & Meares, supra note 3, at 1153–54.
27. Id. (“The occasion for the current doctrine’s demise, we predict, will be the political
revolution that’s now remaking urban law enforcement. From Los Angeles to Dallas, from Chicago
to New York City, cities throughout the nation are rediscovering curfews, anti-loitering laws, ordermaintenance policing, and related law-enforcement strategies. On the surface, these community
policing techniques bear a striking resemblance to the ones that communities used to reinforce the
exclusion of minorities from the Nation’s political life before the 1960’s. But there is a critical
difference in political context. Far from being the targets of these new law-enforcement strategies,
inner-city minority residents are now their primary sponsors. Flexing their newfound political
muscle, these citizens are demanding effective law enforcement.”).
28. Id. at 1154.
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enforcement of criminal law.”29 Minority communities support “new
community policing” efforts such as anti-loitering, anti-prostitution, antidrug dealing, and “other forms of public disorder,”30 Kahan and Meares
argue, both because they are effective31 and because they “view [them] as the
least destructive” method of deterring more serious crime.32
The implications of this claim are obvious: Paternalistic judicial
supervision must be replaced by reinvigorated localism that empowers Black
urban communities. “Who should we trust to judge whether these [new
community policing] policies reasonably balance liberty and order in the
inner-city?”33 For Kahan and Meares, the answer is local communities and
residents, not “judges and . . . civil libertarians.”34 First, local citizens have
“concrete, local knowledge” in that “[their] interests are most directly
affected” both by the criminalized conduct and by its enforcement.35 Second,
29. Id. at 1167 (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 1160–61 (also noting that “other communities, most famously New York City, have
turned their attention to aggressive panhandling, public drunkenness, vandalism and other forms of
public disorder”); see also Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated
Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 198–99 (1998)
[hereinafter Meares & Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking].
31. “First, they believe that it will work. Giving the police the authority to control low-level
disorder is perceived as essential to deterring more serious crimes. The most sophisticated recent
work in criminology confirms this perception.” Kahan & Meares, supra note 3, at 1163 (footnote
omitted).
32. Id. at 1165. Kahan and Meares write:
The attitude of inner-city minorities toward the criminal law is suffused with
ambivalence. They obviously resent their exposure to disproportionate criminal
victimization, and expect relief. But unlike many whites who also strongly resent crime,
they have not renounced their concern for the very individuals who are, or who are likely
to become, criminal victimizers. Rather, law-abiding residents of the inner-city are likely
to feel a strong sense of “linked fate” with inner-city law-breakers, with whom they are
intimately bound by social and familial ties.
Id. (footnote omitted); Meares & Kahan, supra note 30, at 210 (“In fact, it may be precisely because
they care so deeply about these persons that residents of the inner-city prefer relatively mild gang
loitering and curfew laws over draconian penalty enhancements for gang crimes, severe mandatory
minimum prison sentences for drug distribution, and similarly punitive measures. Inner-city
residents may believe these harsher penalties visit an intolerably destructive toll on the whole
community. The pervasive sense of linked fate between the majority of inner city residents and the
youths affected by curfews and gang loitering ordinances again furnishes a compelling reason not
to second guess the community’s determination that such measures enhance rather than detract from
liberty.”).
33. Kahan & Meares, supra note 3, at 1177.
34. Id.; Meares & Kahan, supra note 30, at 209 (“A 1990s conception of rights should follow
two principles: community burden sharing and guided discretion. The first determines when courts
should relax their individualist distrust of community judgments, while the second assures that the
trust afforded community power is not abused.”) (emphasis omitted).
35. Kahan & Meares, supra note 3, at 1177. They explain:
[Local citizens] fac[e] a heightened risk of criminal victimization and . . . live[] with the
destructive impact of crime on the economic and social life of those communities; and,
at least with respect to the mainstays of the new community policing, [they are] the one[s]
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local citizens are more likely than judges to understand “[t]he complex
interplay of norms, law, and liberty”—meaning they will know whether
creation of a new criminal offense can actually enhance liberty by
counteracting “widely resented norms” that push citizens to engage in
conduct they otherwise would not.36
B. The Turn Towards Empathy through Devolution
Moving forward almost a decade, one finds that localist thought shifts
in tone away from a critique of judicial paternalism and toward a constructive
project of political devolution. This is evident in the final works of William
Stuntz, culminating in his 2011 book The Collapse of American Criminal
Justice.37 In Stuntz’s view, one of the primary causes of the contemporary
crisis of racially disparate mass incarceration is that power over criminal
justice has been diffused away from minority urban communities and into
larger county-level jurisdictions dominated by upper middle-class whites.38

who feel[] the pinch of these laws in a meaningful way. Consequently, [they are] in the
best position, practically and morally, to decide whether the balance they strike between
liberty and order is reasonable.
Id.
36. Id. at 1181–82. Additionally, they state:
Many forms of inner-city criminality are fueled by widely resented norms. In a school
in which many students are armed, even ones who resent guns will choose to arm
themselves. In a neighborhood in which many juveniles hang out on the street corner at
night, many will feel compelled to hang out so as not to be excluded from social life. In
a community in which gang activity is rampant, many individuals will choose to join
gangs, not because they look up to gang members, but because they perceive (incorrectly)
that a majority of their peers do and (correctly) that failing to join exposes them to a risk
of predation. Laws that interfere with these norms will decrease the liberty of those who
intrinsically value carrying guns, hanging out at night, and joining gangs, but increase the
liberty of those who want the option of not engaging in these activities without suffering
the adverse consequences of acting contrary to prevailing norms.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
37. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7 (2011).
38. Stuntz states:
No legal rules commanded those results; rather, political equilibrium produced them. In
the twentieth century’s second half, that equilibrium unraveled. Suburban populations
mushroomed, diluting poor city neighborhoods’ electoral power; big-city police forces
grew more professionalized, hence more detached from the streets they patrol. Crime
became a live issue in state and national elections, shifting political power from highcrime cities to the safer suburbs and countryside.
Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1973; see also STUNTZ, supra note 37 (“Today, a large fraction—often a
large majority—of the population of cities and metropolitan counties live in neighborhoods where
crime is an abstraction, not a problem that defines neighborhood life. This gives power over
criminal justice to voters who have little stake in how the justice system operates. Second, the
suburban population of metropolitan counties mushroomed. This shift in local populations matters
enormously, because prosecutors and judges are usually elected at the county level. Today, counties
that include major cities have a much higher percentage of suburban voters than in the past. This
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“[I]nequality . . . arose, in large measure,” he wrote, “because of the decline
of local democratic control over criminal justice outcomes.”39
The solution for Stuntz, then, is the promotion of a revived localism in
criminal justice. Underlying the promise of localism is a quasi-psychological
claim: Citizens are more moderate in their criminal justice policy positions
when their punitive intuitions against offenders are balanced by an empathy
that comes from personally knowing offenders who are punished.40 Thus, if
moderation (and its resultant racial equality) is desirable, more power must
be given to those who both experience the anger of criminal victimization
and possess the empathy that comes from knowing incarcerated people. If
urban citizens of color are more likely to have these features, then shrinking
jurisdictional boundaries would concentrate their power and work to
moderate and equalize outcomes:
[P]lace more power in the hands of residents of high-crime city
neighborhoods—for they feel the effects of rising and falling rates
of crime and punishment, just as shareholders feel the effects of
rising and falling corporate profits. Make criminal justice more
locally democratic, and justice will be both more moderate and
more egalitarian.41
The moderation and egalitarianism of these newly empowered local
citizens would primarily be implemented through juries. The trend towards
mass plea-bargaining, with its delegation of power to prosecutors, must be
reversed.42 Moreover, substantive criminal law has a part to play in Stuntz’s
vision. Culpability elements should be made more “open-ended” and

means suburban voters, for whom crime is usually a minor issue, exercise more power over urban
criminal justice than in the past.”).
39. Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1973.
40. Stuntz elaborates, explaining:
The desire for order and the longing for freedom, anger at crime and empathy for the
young men whom police officers arrest and prosecutors charge—both forces are
powerful, and they push in opposite directions. Anyone who has been the victim of a
serious crime knows the desire to see perpetrators punished that seems to be part of our
nature. At the same time, all those who have seen neighbors’ sons, or their own, behind
bars know the agony incarceration imposes on local communities.
Id. at 1981 (footnote omitted).
41. Id. at 1974; see also STUNTZ, supra note 37, at 311 (“The notion that condemnation and
punishment are essential but also dangerous comes most naturally to those whose lives most
resemble the lives of the criminal defendants who are subject to the justice system’s justice. This
is why the style of local democracy that governed much of America’s criminal justice system for
much of the nation’s past worked reasonably well . . . .”).
42. STUNTZ, supra note 37, at 295 (“Over the course of the past few decades, prosecutors have
replaced judges as the system’s key sentencing decisionmakers, exercising their power chiefly
through plea bargaining. That prosecutorial power is unchecked by law and, given its invisibility,
barely checked by politics.”).
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“vague[]”43 so that the jury can explicitly consider punitive desert without
“the stigma of nullification.”44
Stuntz’s localism, like that of Kahan and Meares, rests on the claim that
those most directly impacted by criminal justice—local citizens—should
have more control over the system. For Stuntz, it is the “moderat[ion]” and
“egalitarian[ism]” of these local citizens that makes them suitable
repositories of criminal justice power;45 for Kahan and Meares it is these
citizens’ superior “local knowledge” regarding liberty and order tradeoffs.46
These two views overlap in substantial ways.
C. The Movement for “Democratization”
More recently,47 criminal justice localism has seen a resurgence in the
“Democratization” movement. Typified by the views expressed in a 2017
symposium, an introductory Manifesto by Joshua Kleinfeld lays out the basic
claim: The American phenomenon of racially disparate mass incarceration
can be blamed on the current system’s “bureaucratic” approach, which
prioritizes expertise and efficiency over justice according to community
moral views.48 The antidote to bureaucratization and its resultant racist mass
incarceration, these scholars claim, is democratization—a reorientation
towards local lay values.49 Consider the following passage from the
Manifesto:

43. Stuntz, supra note 4, at 2032, 2039.
44. STUNTZ, supra note 37, at 303 (“Vaguely defined crimes have one other critical virtue: they
are democracy’s friend. Reintroducing a measure of vagueness to American criminal law would
trigger more jury trials, and would invite the kinds of jury verdicts Paul Butler encouraged—without
the stigma of nullification.”).
45. Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1974.
46. Kahan & Meares, supra note 3, at 1177 (emphasis omitted); see supra notes 34–36 and
accompanying text.
47. One localist voice that came between Stuntz and the Democratization movement discussed
below is found in a 2014 piece by Lauren Ouziel. After assessing disparities in the punitiveness of
federal and state prosecutions of “street crime,” Ouziel posits that the more punitive federal
outcomes may be a result of a greater perceived legitimacy. Lauren M. Ouziel, Legitimacy and
Federal Criminal Enforcement Power, 123 YALE L.J. 2236, 2244 (2014). After unpacking why the
federal system is perceived as more legitimate, the recipe for increased state legitimacy, according
to Ouziel, appears to be “enhancing localism—through greater accountability, participation, and
local voice in both criminal lawmaking and law enforcement.” Id. at 2243–44 (emphasis omitted).
Through the concept of perceptions of legitimacy, Ouziel thus imports a form of the Kahanian and
Mearesian argument: “[L]ocalities should consider more robust use of local laws,” because local
laws “impart a message . . . that the penal law has not been foisted upon them by a governing body
with little understanding of the issues surrounding urban street crime and its enforcement.” Id. at
2323–24.
48. Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1367,
1376 (2017).
49. Id.
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On one side are those who think the root of the present crisis is the
outsized influence of the American public—a violent, vengeful,
stupid, uninformed, racist, indifferent, or otherwise wrongheaded
American public—and the solution is to place control over
criminal justice in the hands of officials and experts. On the other
side are those who think the root of the present crisis is a set of
bureaucratic attitudes, structures, and incentives divorced from the
American public’s concerns and sense of justice, and the solution
is to make criminal justice more community focused and
responsive to lay influences.50
Democratization, therefore, prioritizes devolution to local, non-professional
decisionmakers.
The most concrete product of the movement is the White Paper of
Democratic Criminal Justice.51 Thirty proposals are laid out.52 The
proposals and scholarship that appear to call for localism most directly are
those dealing with criminal procedure—not substantive criminal law.
Consider the proposals regarding community “links” with police and
prosecutors:
• Community-Police Links.—Civilian review boards to advise
police departments and liaise between police departments and
local communities should be established. The boards should
include individuals of diverse backgrounds, at least some of
whom live in the neighborhoods in which the majority of
police activity takes place.53
• Community-Prosecutor Links.—The jurisdictional boundaries
of prosecutorial offices should be redrawn to make
prosecutors, whether appointed or elected, responsive to
smaller and more cohesive communities. With respect to
elected prosecutors, jurisdictional boundaries should be
redrawn to ensure that the neighborhoods in which
prosecutions regularly take place are also the neighborhoods
determining the outcome of the elections.54
These proposals demonstrate an affinity for localism in procedural, rather
than substantive, criminal law.
Some of the calls for localism in these proposals are recognizably those
of Jocelyn Simonson. In her symposium contribution, Simonson argues that
the “racial domination and systemic oppression of vulnerable populations

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Kleinfeld et al., supra note 5.
Id. at 1697–1705.
Id. at 1700.
Id. at 1702.
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endemic to our contemporary criminal justice system”55 can be combatted
by, among other things, shifting power to contest the system to smaller, more
local groups: “Many of these forms of contestation display a faith in local
democracy as a tool of responsive criminal justice . . . . These forms of
resistance and contestation are . . . not revolutionary, but devolutionary.”56
There, she referred specifically to “grassroots forms of participation in and
disruption
of”
investigation
and
adjudication—“copwatching,
courtwatching, or community bail funds.”57 Simonson hints at the end,
though, that her localism may be broader: “Finally, we can imagine statedriven processes that themselves allow for community control of local
criminal justice policies and priorities. . . . . Any push to move
decisionmaking and resource allocation in criminal justice down to the local
level is a potentially useful one.”58
While Simonson says that she potentially supports “[a]ny” devolution
in criminal justice, one wonders if she is thinking of the local criminalization
contemplated by Kahan and Meares.59 Each of the examples of local control
she mentions explicitly—juries, police review boards, and judicial control of
police—involve investigation and adjudication.60
Simonson’s more recent work focuses exclusively on community
control of the police, arguing for “shifting power to policed populations,”
perhaps even to the neighborhood level.61 In this claim for devolution in
criminal procedure (specifically power over police), one finds the most wellexpressed version of Simonson’s justifications for localism. She identifies
three: (1) reparations to a population that has historically been marginalized
by policing policies; (2) enhancing “antisubordination” of those groups; and
55. Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and Resistance,
111 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 1611 (2017).
56. Id. at 1612 (footnote omitted).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1622–23 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
59. See supra Section I.A.
60. In a later article with a telling title—The Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure—
Simonson argues that “bottom-up resistance to local police actions and prosecutions” should be
viewed as “the People” participating just as much as the prosecutor representing “the People.”
Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “the People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 249,
249 (2019).
61. Simonson, supra note 15, at 787. Simonson also states:
In contrast to the instrumentalist approach or the legitimacy approach, the movement
focus on governance and policymaking in police reform adds a different idea about what
it means to regulate the police effectively. The reform proposals from movement groups
surface the specific role that policing plays in denying people in highly policed
neighborhoods their democratic standing and collective political impact. They advocate
reform efforts to counteract the antidemocratic nature of policing. They focus on power.
Id. at 784. “With respect to policing in particular, movement actors make a deliberate attempt to
reclaim the notion of ‘community’ as one of bottom-up power . . . .” Id. at 817.
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(3) the promotion of a “contestatory democracy” in which state-sponsored
domination and violence is resisted by “countervailing power.”62 The
“power-shifting” model claims that these three values are best maximized by
devolution of police control to local institutions.63 As Simonson wrote in an
article co-authored with Sabeel Rahman:
[P]art of the value of this focus on the city is not just in the
substantive policies cities can innovate and experiment with, but
also in the processes and strategies for power-shifting they can
develop. Cities, on our read, are vital in part as incubators for new
democratic practices and strategies.64
Simonson’s commitment to localism, though, is qualified by the
expectation that local power-shifting will yield certain substantive results.
She explicitly disclaims “the valorization of local politics for its own sake,”
and warns that “local control can be as oppressive as it can be liberatory.”65
“Our normative call, then, is not for localism-qua-localism, but rather for a
scholarly focus on concrete mechanisms of power-shifting in governance
toward the relatively powerless.”66 Localism, then, is only instrumentally
valuable insofar as it might maximize equality and regulate violent state
actors.67
Laura Appleman is another vocal proponent of localism among the
democratizers. Like other contributors, she is most interested in localizing
criminal procedure—specifically, in reviving the jury.68 Her focus is
localism in adjudication: “Many of our modern woes in the criminal justice
system can be traced to the loss of the community voice and decisionmaking
ability in adjudicating crime and punishment.”69 Appleman does not discuss
local legislatures or substantive criminalization; she is concerned with
reviving the role of the jury as an outlet of “democratic localism” that is
62. Id. at 787 (emphasis omitted).
63. Id. at 809. Simonson also describes how social movement actors have advocated for
national legislation, but these efforts focus on the redistribution of federal spending away from law
enforcement and towards community programs. Id. at 824. There is no call for a federalization of
all policing or for unform national standards of police conduct.
64. Rahman & Simonson, supra note 16, at 741.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 741–42 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 741 n.273 (“To the extent that we are
entering the debate over the value of localism in the context of federalism, we would also endorse
a normative frame that places limits on localism to the extent that it bumps up against values of
equality and inclusion.” (citing Davidson, supra note 20, at 984–93)).
67. But see Simonson, supra note 15, at 809 (“The idea of power shifting is not inherently
abolitionist, or even left-leaning; community control, for instance, could be an institution that people
who want more policing take up in the name of public safety.”).
68. See Laura I. Appleman, Local Democracy, Community Adjudication, and Criminal Justice,
111 NW. U. L. REV. 1413 (2017).
69. Id. at 1414 (“[H]istorical vision of criminal process where the lay public was closely
involved in adjudicatory justice.”).
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constitutionally mandated by the Sixth Amendment.70 But the constitutional
mandate of a jury is valuable for non-formalistic reasons. In making the case
for a robust local jury system, Appleman relies on theories of the functional
“values” of devolution from localism and federalism literature.71 Most
prominent is a moral diversity argument (more on this later):72 Juries allow
for local moral viewpoints to be expressed in criminal justice—presumably
through their choice to convict or to nullify. “Indeed,” she writes, “an
important aspect of localism in criminal justice is ‘its tendency to make the
enforcement of criminal law more responsive to the values, priorities, and
felt needs of local communities.’”73 While other familiar localism arguments
make appearances in Appleman’s contribution,74 this reference to moral
diversity is most central.75
Next, consider Rick Bierschbach’s symposium contribution. He
observes that the criminal justice system’s “fragmentation”—or division of
power amongst different institutions, governments, and actors—presents
both opportunity and risk.76 Fragmentation’s benefits “rest on broadly
democratic concepts like representativeness, deliberation, and selfdetermination,” and “fragmentation “provides multiple nodes of input that
allow communities and neighborhoods to tailor on-the-ground criminal
justice to their unique needs and reconcile competing values and priorities in

70. Id. at 1413, 1415 (“With its enshrinement of the local community, the Sixth Amendment
community jury trial right delineates one of the most important rights in our criminal justice
system . . . .”).
71. Id. at 1421.
72. See infra Section III.A.
73. Appleman, supra note 68, at 1418 (quoting Stephen F. Smith, Localism and Capital
Punishment, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 105, 110 (2011)).
74. Appleman also discusses the participation argument, adding in pro-legitimacy-perception
benefits to participation. Id. at 1419 (“Greater local participation in criminal justice has the
advantage of helping community members feel connected to both the inner workings of the criminal
justice system and the larger civic structure.”). “Local citizens are more likely to think that the
criminal justice system is fair if they have had a direct part to play in its workings.” Id. at 1424.
The liberty-maximization argument also appears as derivative of the moral diversity argument.
“The lay citizen’s ability to integrate community values into criminal justice decisionmaking also
helps the jury fulfill one of its primary duties under the Constitution: resisting governmental abuse
of power against the public and counteracting any judicial bias or corruption.” Id. at 1425.
75.
Community participation also assists in inculcating public preference directly into the
criminal law . . . . Criminal law plays a critical part in helping sustain the moral
agreement needed to maintain social norms in our diverse society . . . . Restoring
community participation to our common criminal procedures likewise restores the
community’s role in creating meaningful social norms.
Id. at 1424–25.
76. Richard A. Bierschbach, Fragmentation and Democracy in the Constitutional Law of
Punishment, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1444–49 (2017).
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their own ways.”77 However, fragmentation diffuses power and causes actors
and institutions to function with “blinder[s]” on, ignoring “broader
interests.”78 It also diminishes accountability.
In the end, though, Bierschbach is optimistic. Fragmentation enables
localism, which generates “democratic benefits . . . in terms of voice and
perspective”:79
Greater attention to the values (but not the doctrine) of federalism
and its close cousin localism could likewise help. Pushing more
criminal justice power—legislative, enforcement, adjudicative,
and penal—down to directly affected communities and
neighborhoods could enhance representativeness and sharpen lines
of authority. City councils could be given real power to craft their
own substantive criminal codes in response to community
concerns—such as stricter gun control laws or more humane
punishments for locally focused crimes—even if far-flung state
legislators disagree. Prosecutorial districts could be drawn more
narrowly to minimize the disconnect between who elects
prosecutors (often suburban voters) and whom they prosecute
(often residents of inner-city communities); judicial districts could
be similarly tailored.80
Devolution of power and resources, he thinks, will help to ameliorate the
harmful effects of fragmentation and expand its positive effects.
Another symposium contributor, Stephanos Bibas, also demonstrates an
unmistakable affinity for criminal justice localism.81 His monograph, The
Machinery of Criminal Justice, documents, explains, and critiques the
modern evolution of the justice system into a plea bargaining “machine[]”
alien to the popular notion of criminal justice as a “morality play” or “form
of educational social theater.”82 Describing his prescription for reform, Bibas
writes:
[T]he problem is too diverse for a single national fix. No one
statute or Supreme Court decision, or even a sequential reform
program, will fix our broken system from above. Rather, we need
77. Id. at 1446.
78. Id. at 1448–49.
79. Id. at 1450.
80. Id. at 1452.
81. Stephanos Bibas, Restoring Democratic Moral Judgment Within Bureaucratic Criminal
Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1677 (2017). So as not to present an oversimplified picture, I should
note that in a later work co-authored by Bibas & Bierschbach, they express some concern that
localism may create negative externalities because it prevents actors and institutions from
considering collective costs. Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal
Justice, 116 MICH. L. REV. 187, 243 (2017) (“How can we retain our commitment to [localism]
while still capturing the benefits of the [rationing to avoid externalities]? We do not have one simple
answer.”).
82. STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE xv–xvi (2012).
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bottom-up populism to pursue a multi-faceted approach. Reform
is more likely to happen at the mid-level of counties, cities, and
neighborhoods, and the micro-level of individual criminal cases.
A variety of outsider pressures, organized and amplified through
social-networking technology, can marshal outsiders’ voices and
their desire to participate at the retail level.83
Localism is intrinsically valuable in that it allows “laymen [to] play more
substantial and active roles in criminal justice,” thus humanizing the
machine, but it is also a pragmatic reform strategy in that it helps avoid the
potentially intractable barriers to reform that a top-down approach would
face.84
Last to consider is the contribution of Joshua Kleinfeld.85 Kleinfeld’s
positions on localism and devolution of political power stem from his theory
of criminal law: reconstructivism. “[R]econstructivism holds that criminal
justice’s distinctive social function is to protect and repair the social norms
on which community solidarity depends in the wake of acts that attack those
norms,” and that therefore “the moral culture disclosed by a community’s
public deliberations or implicit in its social practices and institutions” should
be reflected by the content of criminal law and criminal procedure.86 Given
that moral culture is the lodestar of Kleinfeld’s theory, it makes sense that he
would generally support localism: Smaller jurisdictional boundaries are more
likely to result in majorities with similar ethical lives. “[L]ocalism . . . can
be used to reduce the incidences of value disagreement and the need to work
out universal values,” he writes, and “[w]ith exceptions for areas of pressing
national need and solid national consensus, criminal law should vary with the
community whose ethical life it is preserving.”87
D. The Critique of the Misdemeanor Justice System
Recent scholarship critically assessing the misdemeanor criminal justice
system—especially the work of Alexandra Natapoff—is the last example of
localist thought to consider. In her pathbreaking book, Punishment Without
Crime, Natapoff highlights various problematic features of the sub-felony
world: its vast scale and deep impact on the liberty and property of citizens,
its lack of concern for factual guilt or innocence, its overreliance on monetary
fines and fees (deployed for revenue-generating purposes), and its racial
83. Id. at xxvi.
84. Id. at xxv.
85. Joshua Kleinfeld, Three Principles of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV.
1455 (2017).
86. Id. at 1456. “[R]econstructivism insists on the moral authority of a community’s ethical
life in the context of criminal law.” Id. at 1475.
87. Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 1485, 1562 (2016).
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disparities.88 Natapoff claims that these features violate basic conditions of
legitimacy in criminal law theory, including the rule of law, the commitment
to evidence, and the blameworthiness requirement.89 The system is also
therefore “antidemocratic,” or at least has antidemocratic effects, in that it
maintains large-scale social inequality, operates as a form of regressive
taxation and wealth redistribution, and tolerates local authoritarianism.90
Natapoff’s diagnosis of the misdemeanor system’s ills, like some of the prior
thinkers, is procedure-centric.91 In general, she is concerned with how the
misdemeanor adjudicative system combines unnecessary police intrusions
(e.g., arrests for quota purposes),92 official (even judicial) lawlessness, and
overworked public defenders in order to produce mass plea bargaining and
the resultant fee-payments—“meet ’em and plead ’em” adjudication, or
“McJustice.”93
Natapoff’s vision of reform deploys many of the familiar localism
arguments already discussed. In the final chapter of her book, entitled
“Change,”94 she writes that “many misdemeanor changes will of necessity be
bottom-up, driven by local residents, advocates, and public officials.”95 This
is a cause for hope, though, and not concern: “The beauty of localism,
however, is that it offers enormous room for creativity and experimentation;
each jurisdiction can implement change in its own ways, given its own
population, history, needs, and resources.”96 She then directly cites to Justice
Brandeis’s New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann97 dissent, concluding that “[i]n the
misdemeanor world, every . . . municipality can launch its own
experiment.”98
88. See generally NATAPOFF, supra note 6.
89. Id. at 191.
90. Id. at 203–06.
91. This procedural focus is perhaps understandable, since part of the point of the low-level
offense literature is to emphasize that, in Malcolm Feeley’s words, “the process . . . is
the . . . punishment” for these offenses. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT:
HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 199 (1979). The offense of public urination in
most jurisdictions may carry only a very minor sentence, and therefore the true punishment lies in
the aggravation of showing up to court and paying the fees (or going to jail if a court date is missed
or a fee unpaid).
92. NATAPOFF, supra note 6, at 59.
93. Id. at 3–4.
94. Id. at 211.
95. Id. at 226.
96. Id. at 226–27.
97. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
98. NATAPOFF, supra note 6, at 227. I am not alone in drawing this conclusion. Consider Judge
Bibas’s review of the book. Bibas, supra note 10, at 1041 (“Natapoff sees [localities’] bottom-up
role as both inevitable and desirable, letting them try out creative experiments.”); id. (“Some
communities prize orderly public spaces and are willing to trade away more liberty. Others are
more relaxed about social disorder and disruption. The genius of American federalism (and
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In a recent article, Natapoff is more restrained in her approval of
localism.99 Speaking specifically about local courts, she writes that the
“responsiveness” and “accountability” of local judges allows them to “push
back against many of the prime inequities and dysfunctions of the low-level
misdemeanor process,” but the judges can also choose to become “complicit
in the local promotion of mass incarceration” if they “effectively validate”
pro-carceral law enforcement policies.100 The dilemma of localism, then,
predictably manifests itself in these institutions.101 One senses, though, that
she remains optimistic. “[Local] courts also reflect the persistent allure of
local accountability,” she writes, and “[i]n the criminal context, that allure is
not irrational.”102 Moreover, she points to examples of progressive localism
(such as antidiscrimination ordinances) and suggests that “[p]erhaps [local
courts] could provide enlightened criminal policy leadership too.”103
II. CRIMINAL LAW LOCALISM: THE ONE-WAY RATCHET
The preceding discussion recounts a persistent pro-localist bent among
criminal justice scholars. Many make explicit calls for devolution of
criminalization decisions, while others focus on policing and adjudication, or
make more generalized calls for downward power-shifting. Overlooked by
all is a recognition of a critical limitation on localities in the field of
substantive criminal law. As I will describe, features of local government
law—enshrined in state constitutions and their judicial interpretations—
make local power over criminalization more constrained than is immediately
apparent. In the context of criminal law, localism functions as a “one-way
ratchet” for more criminalization.
A. Localities Cannot Subtract
When one thinks in the abstract about the devolution of power over the
content of criminal law, this power would seem to include the power to create
or to abolish criminal offenses. This would be the effect of a complete
devolution of the states’ “primary authority for defining . . . the criminal

localism) is that the police and prosecutors in each community can calibrate the level of enforcement
to their communities. Communities can govern themselves, deliberating on and making their own
tradeoffs. There is not a single Platonic ideal, but a range of approaches. And democracy is not
static, but adapts these approaches over time to each community’s needs and in light of what it
learns from experimenting.”).
99. Natapoff, supra note 22.
100. Id. at 1030–32.
101. Id. at 1034 (“[M]unicipal courts are paradigmatic examples of the tense relationship
between criminal justice and local democracy.”).
102. Id.
103. Id.

2022]

AGAINST CRIMINAL LAW LOCALISM

1139

law.”104 A devolution of this nature would carry with it ambivalent
implications for criminal justice—what would matter would be how the
power was used. But features of American local government law (enshrined
in state constitutions) make such a total devolution impossible in the United
States and make the implications of criminalization devolution more certain.
Most important is the axiom that local governments have no power to
repeal state law, a disability105 that is a feature of their legal status. As a
matter of federal constitutional law, “[m]unicipal corporations are political
subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising such
of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them.”106 No
state’s constitution voluntarily entrusts to a locality the ability to nullify state
law within its territory, and the prospects of such a power being granted in
the future by constitutional amendment are so unlikely as to be fanciful.107
The efficacy of state law throughout a state’s borders is thus a bedrock
presumption whenever thinking of local lawmaking; it pervades
jurisdictional boundaries and is always operative. Think of jurisdictions as
concentric circles:

Even when one is living one’s life in the smallest ring, one is still also
“inside” both larger rings. Note also how the circles appear to stack on top
of each other: The internal circle does not carve out a piece of the greater
circle. These are the two salient features of the jurisdictional relationships
104. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
128 (1982)).
105. “Disability” is used here in the Hohfeldian sense. See Joseph William Singer, The Legal
Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, WIS. L. REV. 975, 986 (1982)
(“‘Disabilities’ are the absence of power to alter legal entitlements . . . .”).
106. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
107. Indeed, such a grant of power may be unconstitutional under the proposition in Hunter just
noted. Id.
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between states and localities: State law always applies no matter the local
jurisdiction, and local law cannot subtract from it. State law can be said to
be inviolable and universal throughout all local jurisdictions within the state.
This proposition is so axiomatic that it is rarely if ever litigated. A 2008
opinion from the Supreme Court of Ohio, however, helps to illustrate the
point.108 In Mendenhall v. Akron,109 the court analyzed the validity of an
ordinance passed by the City of Akron, which created a system that used
traffic cameras to enforce speeding in school zones.110 The system was civil
in nature, with a sanction of monetary fines imposed on violators (and no
police involvement).111
Plaintiffs sued, arguing that the ordinance
“decriminalize[d] behavior that is criminal under state law.”112 The court
rejected this argument, concluding that “[t]he ordinance does not change the
speed limits established by state law or change the ability of police officers
to cite offenders for traffic violations.”113 Even though the ordinance covered
the “identical conduct” covered by the statute, its noncriminal nature had no
effect on the statute: “[T]he city ordinance does not replace traffic law. It
merely supplements it.”114
B. Localities Can Add
While localities cannot subtract from criminal law, as Mendenhall
suggests, what remains of local power is to add—to place beneath the
preexisting state code an additional subterranean layer of offenses. How
much latitude the locality has is determined by the extent of the delegation in
either the state constitution or in state statutes. Scholars of local government
law mark out three general categories of institutional arrangement: Dillon’s
Rule, imperio home rule, and legislative home rule.115 A Dillon’s Rule state
has no constitutional grant of power to localities; only ad hoc statutory grants
are given for certain localities and for certain types of rulemaking.116 An
imperio home rule state preserves a nineteenth-century form of home rule in
which the state constitution insulates local law from state preemption so long

108. Mendenhall v. Akron, 881 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio 2008).
109. 881 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio 2008).
110. Id. at 258.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 264.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial
Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1338–39 nn.10–12 (2009).
116. Id. at nn.10–12. Another way of putting this is that these states do not recognize home rule.
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as the local law affects only “local” and not state concerns.117 A legislative
home rule state grants a presumption that localities have general lawmaking
powers—both in matters of state and local concern—but eliminates
immunity from preemption if the state legislature acts on the same topic.118
Again, note that under all of these regimes, the local legislation will result in
a net addition of criminal law in the given jurisdiction. None of these powergranting institutional structures permits the locality to exempt its citizens
from statewide criminal offenses.119
Moreover, the institutional arrangements just noted are protected by an
array of preemption doctrines that provide the framework within which local
legislation is assessed for compliance.120 These doctrines can be thought of
as setting the boundaries around localities’ criminalization power. In the
words of the leading local government law treatise: “It is fundamental that
municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws of the
state. The purpose of the preemption doctrine is to establish a priority
between potentially conflicting laws enacted by various levels of
government.”121 Preemption doctrines usually stand as no impediment to
local criminalization that adds to the range of conduct covered by state law,
and in some cases, they encourage it.
Preemption can be express or implied.122 An example of express
preemption is a state law with a provision stating that “no local authority

117. Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1124–25 (2007) (“[M]any early
home-rule regimes established essentially separate—and exclusive—sovereigns whose areas of
authority did not overlap . . . .”).
118. As Richard Briffault writes, “The rise of the legislative home rule model . . . trades away
all immunity in order to assure greater scope to local initiative . . . .” Richard Briffault, Home Rule
and Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL. 1, 28 (2006).
119. An imperio home rule regime might immunize against preemption a local ordinance
“permitting” certain conduct, but this would not result in a correspondent invalidation of the state
law. There would be no inverse preemption, in other words.
120. See generally Diller, supra note 117. In some states the state legislature’s ability to preempt
local law is limited by state constitutional law, but this is true only in about one quarter of the states,
and even in these jurisdictions the limitations are quite weak. See Joshua S. Sellers & Erin A.
Scharff, Preempting Politics: State Power and Local Democracy, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1374
(2020) (“In sum, though enormous variation exists across jurisdictions, local government authority
is often significantly circumscribed.”).
121. 5 MCQUILLIN MUNICIPAL CORP. § 15:18 (3d ed. 2021) (footnote omitted); see also
Patterson v. Tehama Cty., 229 Cal. Rptr. 696, 702–03 (Ct. App. 1986) (“Since a county cannot enact
an ordinance in conflict with state law, a fortiori a county cannot by ordinance repeal, abrogate, or
nullify a state law.”), depublished by 235 Cal. Rptr. 867 (Ct. App. 1987).
122. Most states mirror the preemption categories created by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
federal-state context. See Diller, supra note 117, at 1140 (“Despite some superficial distinctions,
most states’ preemption analyses are similar in form to the federal model.”); see also Pac. Gas &
Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203–04 (1983)
(describing traditional preemption categories, including express preemption, field preemption, and
conflict preemption).

1142

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:1119

shall enact or enforce any ordinance on a matter covered by this chapter
unless expressly authorized.”123 Preemption can be implied even absent such
an express provision, though, when the local ordinance creates a “conflict”
with the statute.124 The most widely used form of conflict preemption in state
law is the so-called “prohibit/permit” test.125 This test finds preemption when
a local ordinance prohibits what the state statute permits, or permits what a
state statute prohibits.126 Many states interpret this to mean that local
ordinances can only survive preemption if they are “more stringent” than a
state statute on point—meaning that they cover more conduct.127 Finally, an
ordinance can be impliedly preempted if a court holds that an entire “field”
of regulation has been “occupied” exclusively by the state; field preemption
shuts out local legislation where comprehensiveness and uniformity are
sought.128
Local criminalization is not usually impeded by preemption doctrine—
at least not if localities follow the guideposts. First, courts rarely hold that a
state criminal code, or a part of it, has occupied the field of criminal
regulation entirely.129 Widespread deployment of field preemption would
shut down local criminalization, but this has not happened.130 Express

123. Masone v. City of Aventura, 147 So. 3d 492, 496 (Fla. 2014) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
FLA. STAT. § 316.007 (2008)); see also id. at 498 (holding that local red light camera ordinance
expressly preempted by Florida Uniform Traffic Control Law). In an even more extreme category,
a small number of states impose civil or even criminal liability for an official to attempt to
undermine state law by passing preempted legislation (this is now called “super” or “hyper”
preemption). See Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995,
1995 (2018) (describing phenomenon); Erin Adele Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the
State-Local Relationship?, 106 GEO. L.J. 1469, 1494 (2018) (same).
124. Diller, supra note 117, at 1141–42. Some states use a variant of what federal law calls
obstacle preemption and ask whether the ordinance creates a “substantial interference” with the
statute, but this is only true of three states. Id. at 1168 n.274.
125. Id. at 1142 n.132.
126. Id. at 1142. Diller is highly critical of the test, calling it “a fundamentally flawed approach
that creates tremendous confusion for courts and litigants. ‘Prohibit/permit,’ in its most extreme
form, is an argument almost shocking in its sophistic simplicity; nonetheless, litigants challenging
local ordinances frequently rely upon it.” Id.
127. Id. at 1146.
128. Id. at 1150.
129. Only one jurisdiction appears to hold that all criminal law is preempted: South Carolina.
See, e.g., Beachfront Ent., Inc. v. Town of Sullivan’s Island, 666 S.E.2d 912, 914 (S.C. 2008)
(finding that the local criminal offense of allowing smoking in the workplace was preempted
because “it conflicts with State criminal law by imposing a criminal penalty for conduct that is not
illegal under State law”). This is effectively field preemption via the prohibit/permit test.
130. For examples of the rare cases finding certain categories of conduct are field-preempted
from local criminalization, see State v. Crawley, 447 A.2d 565, 571 (N.J. 1982) (field of loiteringtype conduct occupied by state law); Lambert v. City of Atlanta, 250 S.E.2d 456, 457–58 (Ga. 1978)
(field of solicitation and loitering offenses occupied by state law); Pierce v. Commonwealth, 777
S.W.2d 926, 928 (Ky. 1989) (field of sexual solicitation offenses occupied by state law).
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preemption of local crimes is similarly rare.131 The form of preemption that
is most often implicated—conflict preemption—does little to prevent local
criminal offenses from proliferating. The “prohibit/permit” test might be
read to mean that any conduct not criminalized by the state is therefore
“permitted” and off limits for local criminalization, but only one state has
taken this path.132 Usually affirmative evidence of permissive intent is
required,133 but in a liberal society, government does not normally speak of
“permissions” outside of, say, licensure regimes, and therefore few things are
off limits from local “prohibition.” The “more stringent” test, far from
reigning in local criminalization, incentivizes it.134 This test encourages
localities to write offenses more broadly, and to seek out areas for
criminalization not yet regulated by the state. For example, two state high
court cases applying the test have upheld an ordinance because the ordinance,
unlike the state law analogue, eliminated mens rea.135
C. Case Study: Sarasota, Florida
The limits on localities’ powers over the criminalization and
decriminalization of conduct is illustrated by a brief case study. Consider the
City of Sarasota, Florida.
Sarasota has dabbled in “decriminalization,”136 but this effort’s impact
is necessarily limited. In September of 2019, the City Commission “voted
unanimously to decriminalize the possession of less than 20 grams of
cannabis,” replacing a prior criminal offense punishable with up to one year
131. This usually occurs only when a national political issue mirrors itself in a state-local
conflict, such as that over gun rights. See Ortiz v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 152, 156 (Pa. 1996)
(preempting Philadelphia & Pittsburgh ordinances purporting to ban assault weapons after
legislature passed statute in response to ordinances expressly preempting local regulation of this
conduct).
132. See Beachfront Ent., 666 S.E.2d at 913–14.
133. See, e.g., City of Portland v. Jackson, 850 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Or. 1993); Crawley, 447 A.2d
at 567; Thomas v. State, 614 So. 2d 468, 470 (Fla. 1993).
134. Field preemption doctrines similarly encourage localities to seek new areas of criminal
regulation in order to avoid preemption by state law.
135. See Junction City v. Lee, 532 P.2d 1292, 1297–98 (Kan. 1975) (“The ordinance eliminates
the[] [state law] [culpability] elements and is thus more restrictive, more stringent,” the court
observed, and when “the ordinance goes further in its prohibition but not counter to the prohibition
in the statute . . . there is no conflict”); Kansas City v. LaRose, 524 S.W.2d 112, 117 (Mo. 1975)
(“While, as stated, the statute requires that the act be knowingly and willfully done and the ordinance
does not contain those words, we have concluded that no conflict exists which would invalidate the
ordinance. It is clear that any violation of the statute would also be a violation of the ordinance. In
that regard they are entirely consistent. The ordinance has simply gone further and prohibited
interference in cases where willfullness is not shown.”).
136. Decriminalization can mean many things, including total legalization or a conversion of the
criminal offense to a civil violation. See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68
VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1066 (2015) (noting distinction between “decriminalization” and
“legalization”).
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in jail with a “civil citation” sanctioned with a $100 fine.137 Florida state law,
however, remains on the books and punishes possession of less than twenty
grams as a first-degree misdemeanor punishable with a year in jail.138 In the
year following the city’s decriminalization, a docket search of the state statute
in the Sarasota County Court indicated eighty-five cases in which the statute
was enforced—many of which presumably involved possession while within
the city limits.139 Repeal of the local offenses had no effect on state penal
law, which still applied in all localities throughout the state.
One case illustrates the hollow promise of local decriminalization.
Weliton Dos Santos, a 22-year-old from Brazil, was riding his motorcycle in
Sarasota on December 5, 2020, when a Florida State Highway Patrol Officer
observed him traveling in a right-turn-only lane in order to pass and cut off
traffic in the through-lane.140 After initiating a traffic stop, the officer
137. Billy Cox, Sarasota Votes to Decriminalize Small Amount of Marijuana, HERALD TRIB.
(Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.heraldtribune.com/news/20190903/sarasota-votes-to-decriminalizesmall-amount-of-marijuana; SARASOTA, FLA. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 21-10(b)–(c)(1) (2022)
(possession of less than twenty grams punished with “civil citation” and $100 fine or community
service).
138. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.13(6)(b) (West 2019).
139. Docket search on file with author. For other examples of such jurisdictional tensions, see
Jordan Laird, Yellow Springs Decriminalizes Marijuana in the Village, DAYTON DAILY NEWS
(Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/yellow-springs-decriminalizesmarijuana-in-the-village/5KBWEHSGYBGWLKQ4U6FTRUL2H4/ (“Ohio State Highway Patrol
troopers and Greene County Sheriff’s deputies are not obligated to charge people applying village
ordinances and may still charge individuals possessing marijuana in the village with misdemeanors
under state law. Breanne Parcels, the village solicitor, said the village can’t prevent those
departments from applying state law but will attempt to educate them about the local ordinance and
ask them to charge accordingly.”); John Luciew, ‘It’s Lunacy’: Pa. Cops Still Busting Plenty of
People for Pot Despite De-Criminalization, Report Says, PENNLIVE (Feb. 10, 2020, 8:55 AM),
https://www.pennlive.com/crime/2020/02/its-lunacy-pa-cops-still-busting-plenty-of-people-forpot-despite-de-criminalization-report-says.html (“City councils in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Erie,
Allentown, Harrisburg, York, Lancaster, and most recently Norristown have all officially
decriminalized possession of a small amount[] of marijuana. However, those city ordinances can’t
repeal state or federal law. So even if a municipality passes a decriminalization ordinance,
state law still says possession is illegal and a person can be arrested. As a result, the pot busts go
on almost unabated, the stats show.”); Nicole Radzievich, District Judge Questions How Bethlehem
Treats Minor Marijuana Offenses, MORNING CALL (Dec. 16, 2019, 8:08 PM),
https://www.mcall.com/news/local/bethlehem/mc-nws-bethlehem-district-judge-marijuanapossession-20191217-wd4hzfkmg5dpfmnl7rmmj3c33u-story.html (“Bethlehem is split between
two counties headed by district attorneys who differ on the issue. . . . Morganelli has said they
would leave it up to individual municipalities to decide on whether to decriminalize amounts of less
than 30 grams, but Lehigh County District Attorney Jim Martin called for the state law, which
makes the violation a criminal misdemeanor, to be enforced.”); John Romano, Romano: St. Pete
Should Mellow Out When it Comes to Marijuana Law, TAMPA BAY TIMES (May 4, 2016),
https://www.tampabay.com/news/localgovernment/romano-st-pete-should-mellow-out-when-itcomes-to-marijuana-law/2275988/ (“Otherwise, if the city passes one plan and the county passes
another, St. Petersburg police officers would potentially have three options at their discretion. They
could follow state law (make an arrest), city law (issue a fine) or county law (enroll in diversion).”).
140. See Dos Santos Docket, R. at 3 (on file with author).
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requested Dos Santos’s driver’s license, and Dos Santos produced what was
“clearly” a false New Jersey identification.141 The officer arrested Dos
Santos for providing a false name, and after conducting a search incident to
arrest he discovered a “small amount of marijuana.”142 Dos Santos was
arrested for the state possession offense as well, and was taken to jail.143
Thus, in the jurisdictional boundaries in which a locality had
“decriminalized” possession of marijuana, this same conduct was part of the
justification for Dos Santos’s arrest and (one expects) eventual punishment.
While Sarasota’s decriminalization efforts are necessarily limited in
impact, this is not true of criminalization. Sarasota’s code of offenses is a
burgeoning one. The city incorporates by reference all state offenses that are
misdemeanors and infractions, and applies a general penalty of a $500 fine
or sixty days imprisonment.144 In addition, the city has created over fifty new
offenses in its “offenses” chapter145 alone, including innovations such as a
prohibition on rushing the field during an athletic event.146
Of course, the local offenses that will most often be enforced and most
often impact peoples’ lives are classic “public order” offenses. An appellate
case from 2012 illustrates how Sarasota’s ordinances have actually been
applied.147 The defendant, a Black man named Lawshea, was asking passersby for money when a shopkeeper called the police to complain:
The people Lawshea approached were an older, married couple
who were headed to a movie. The husband testified that Lawshea
walked up to them and asked for money. The encounter made him
nervous, he said, because “where I come from, we don’t have much
of this.” He gave Lawshea a few dollars and then saw him hurry
away just as a police officer arrived.148
Lawshea fled the officer and ignored his commands, and after the officer
caught up to him Lawshea physically resisted arrest.149 The Florida court
vacated Lawshea’s panhandling conviction under the Sarasota ordinance
because the prosecutors failed to charge or prove that he made his
solicitations in a prohibited area or in a prohibited manner.150 The ordinance
only prohibited “aggressive” panhandling, or panhandling in certain areas,
and the officer therefore initiated the arrest while under the “mistaken view
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id.
SARASOTA, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 1-11, § 21-2 (2022).
Id. ch. 21.
Id. § 21-5 (setting general penalty).
Lawshea v. State, 99 So. 3d 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012).
Id. at 605.
Id.
Id. at 605–06.
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of the law—that it was illegal to panhandle anywhere in the city.”151
However, Lawshea’s conviction for resisting arrest with violence was
affirmed, and he was sentenced to five years imprisonment as a habitual
offender.152 The existence of the local Sarasota offense, which was not itself
violated, set in motion a chain of events with felony-level implications. No
panhandling offense exists in Florida state criminal law.
III. LOCAL CRIMINALIZATION & THE VALUES OF LOCALISM
Because devolution over the power to create substantive criminal law is
a one-way ratchet for increased criminalization, I will argue that criminal law
localism undermines the values it is expected to promote.153 Adding a
subterranean layer of misdemeanor offenses to the existing body of criminal
law results in more punishment—more incarceration and exploitative fines—
and more authorization of policing and surveillance of marginalized
populations. As we will see, this is not the way to maximize the values of
liberty, equality, or efficient experimentation, and carries with it the risk of
oppressive enforcement of parochial norms.154
151. Id. at 605, 607.
152. Id. at 607.
153. Much of the theoretical apparatus relating to the values of localism comes from theories of
federalism. This is no accident. Claims about the benefits of devolving political power in America
are most often discussed when thinking about the federal-state relationship. The justifications for
the devolution, though, usually apply equally to power-shifting from a state to a locality. As Richard
Briffault wrote, “[m]any of the arguments offered on behalf of federalism are not distinctively
associated with the states, but, rather, could be advanced by the empowerment of other subnational
units,” and that therefore “much of the ‘intellectual case for federalism’ often converges with the
case for decentralization, or localism.” Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and
Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1304 (1994) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491 (1987)). Briffault claims that this convergence should not ignore that there
are “features that distinguish the states from local governments and that give the states their unique
place in the American constitutional order.” Id. at 1305. These features include: fixed borders not
changeable without a state’s own consent; no overlapping of borders; a role in national lawmaking;
and inherent, autonomous legislative power. Id. at 1305–06.
154. Some of my arguments build on those made decades ago by Wayne Logan. Logan, supra
note 9, at 1421. Logan should be credited with first drawing attention to local criminal law, and
Logan, unlike the criminal justice localists, expresses concerns about the power of localities to
criminalize conduct: They contribute to the existing problem of overcriminalization, create
“balkanization” of law across the state, and “indulge in a marked tendency toward oppressive use
of the criminal sanction . . . .” Id. at 1421, 1449. The first and the third argument dovetail,
respectively, with two sections below. Regarding the problems of overcriminalization as they
burden individual liberty and dignity, this relates with the below discussion of “liberty-maximizing
localism.” See infra Section III.B. Regarding the oppressive use of criminalization by majorities
against minorities, this relates with the below discussion of “moral diversity localism.” See infra
Section III.A. Since Logan was writing before the rise of criminal justice localism as a major
scholarly movement, he did not have occasion to consider many of the arguments that this Article
responds to. Thus, my critique adds considerations of local criminal law’s effects on equality, and
on the validity of local experimentation in criminal punishment.
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A. Moral Diversity Localism
The most significant argument used by those proposing devolution of
power to localities is that smaller jurisdictions permit different groups to live
under different laws according to their own preferences. In the words of the
Supreme Court, smaller, more local jurisdictions will be “more sensitive to
the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society.”155 Deborah Merritt describes
this as the ability to “create the type of social and political climate [citizens]
prefer,”156 while Barry Friedman calls this “cultural . . . diversity.”157
Devolution has the effect of allowing people to create policies that align with
their value preferences, and also avoids an impasse that might be created by
a larger jurisdiction with more heterogeneous groups.158 Moral diversity
localism contains an embedded descriptive premise as well as a normative
one. First, this theory assumes that moral viewpoints (or values) will be
geographically concentrated. While this seems intuitively true, it is
debatable.159 Normatively, the theory presumes that moral viewpoints should
be maximally reflected in law.
Among the criminal justice localists, moral diversity arguments are
most prominent in the work of Kahan and Meares. Recall that the “concrete,
local knowledge” of urban communities of color serves as their first
justification for devolution over “new community policing.”160 While this
may appear to be a claim about epistemic superiority regarding particular
local conditions, on further inspection “local knowledge” is revealed to be
knowledge about moral viewpoints. Put bluntly, the local knowledge Kahan
and Meares aim to prioritize is knowledge about what a community wants
regarding its criminal justice policies and laws. It is the local citizen “whose
155. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 458 (1991).
156. Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1988).
157. Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 401–02 (1997).
158. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism as Westphalian Liberalism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
769, 770 (2006) (describing federalism as means of devolving contentious moral decisions to local
level so as to “defus[e] deep disagreements”). See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James
Madison) (“Extend the sphere [of territory], and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests;
you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the
rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel
it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.”).
159. Compare Guido Calabresi & Eric S. Fish, Federalism and Moral Disagreement, 101 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 18 (2016) (“Who can doubt the deep geographic divide, in America, of moral attitudes
with respect to guns, abortion, capital punishment, gay marriage, religious fundamentalism, assisted
suicide, and more?”), with JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A
JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 69 (2005) (noting lack of distinctive
identities due to “the ease and frequency of mobility[] [and] the dominance of mass media and mass
marketing of national scope”).
160. See Kahan & Meares, supra note 3, at 1177 (emphasis omitted).
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interests are most directly affected” by laws (or their absence), and therefore
“she is in the best position, practically and morally, to decide” the order and
liberty tradeoff reflected in a criminal law.161 Local citizens should be “free
to decide for themselves” what policies will be enacted; their “judgments on
these matters is entitled to profound respect.”162
Moral diversity arguments are also prevalent in the writings of other
criminal justice localists.163 The proposal of Appleman (echoing Stuntz)164
to empower juries with the effective equivalent of prosecutorial discretion is
rooted in the belief that “an important aspect of localism in criminal justice
is ‘its tendency to make the enforcement of criminal law more responsive to
the values, priorities, and felt needs of local communities.’”165 Similarly,
Bierschbach calls for “tailor[ing] on-the-ground criminal justice” to
“community concerns” and “neighborhood preferences,”166 and Judge
Stephanos Bibas, when reviewing Natapoff’s work, writes that localism
allows for “room for variation” between different communities that may have
different views about criminal justice and “social disorder.”167 Lastly,
Kleinfeld’s reconstructivism is explicit in its demand that “criminal law
should vary with the community whose ethical life it is preserving.”168
When championing the devolution of decision-making power over
substantive criminal law, how should one view the moral diversity argument?
While one should recognize that the claim regarding institutional design is
conceptually coherent, criminal justice scholars should be wary about its
implications and about the theory of criminal law on which it rests. It seems
correct to think that if viewpoints about criminalization are geographically
concentrated and diverse across geographic boundaries, a jurisdictional
boundary that most tightly maps onto the concentration will best permit those
viewpoints to become instantiated in law. But is this desirable? In my view,
the answer is “no.” Moral viewpoints about state punishment are surely
relevant to criminalization, but they should not be maximally represented in
law.

161. Id.
162. Id. at 1179, 1180.
163. See supra Part I.
164. See STUNTZ, supra note 37, at 302.
165. Appleman, supra note 68, at 1418 (quoting Stephen F. Smith, Localism and Capital
Punishment, 64 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 105, 110 (2011)) (discussing localism in the capital
punishment context). Smith also cites to Briffault for the proposition that “‘the representation of
diverse interests’ [is a] core value[] of localism.” Smith, supra (quoting Briffault, supra note 153,
at 1305)).
166. Bierschbach, supra note 76, at 1446, 1448, 1452.
167. See Bibas, supra note 10, at 1041.
168. Kleinfeld, supra note 87, at 1562.
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While moral diversity localism relies on a plausible premise of
geographic concentration, a competing observation must be accounted for—
that even in areas of heavy concentrated agreement about criminal law, there
will always be minorities. One will never find a community with completely
homogenous viewpoints on criminal law. Thus, outside of an abstract ideal,
theories of criminalization devolution will always have “losers” as well as
“winners.” It is because of this “fact of reasonable pluralism”169—coupled
with a recognition of the fundamental value of individual autonomy—that
very many theorists, as well as the Supreme Court, rightly accept a liberal
account of state punishment.170 Liberal claims for criminalization should be
justified in terms that are neutral with respect to claims about the good life,
and this results in a minimalistic criminal law.171
Devolution for the purpose of concentrating majority viewpoints and
facilitating their enactment as law thus presents a threat to liberalism.
Because liberalism seeks a minimal criminal law, diffusion and increased
heterogeneity is more, and not less, desirable. One might say that liberalism
seeks the “lowest common denominator” of punitive restrictions on
autonomy, and that larger jurisdictions promote this. As more viewpoints are
included, the sphere of consensus shrinks. Moral diversity localism in
criminal law, on the other hand, seeks the lowest common denominator of
jurisdictional boundaries, and in so doing, seeks the maximal representation
of viewpoints in criminal law, and therefore a maximal restriction on
autonomy.

169. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 441 (expanded ed., 2005).
170. See, e.g., NICOLA LACEY, STATE PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY
VALUES 143 (Taylor & Francis e-Library ed. 2002) (“What is striking about the traditional theories
of punishment . . . is that they can all be located, at least in their modern forms, at some point within
the liberal tradition in political theory.”); Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: “You Are Entering a Gay
and Lesbian Free Zone”: On the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers.
[Raising Questions About Lawrence, Sex Wars, and the Criminal Law], 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 503, 503–04 (2004). Harcourt states:
For the first time in the history of American criminal law, the United States Supreme
Court has declared that a supermajoritarian moral belief does not necessarily provide a
rational basis for criminalizing conventionally deviant conduct. The Court’s ruling is the
coup de grâce to legal moralism administered after a prolonged, brutish, tedious, and
debilitating struggle against liberal legalism in its various criminal law representations.
Henceforth—or at least until further notice—majoritarian morality no longer
automatically trumps liberal argument (whether consequentialist or deontological) in
defining the reasonable and permissible contours of the penal code.
Harcourt, supra (footnotes omitted).
171. See LACEY, supra note 170, at 146–47. The core of a liberal criminal law is thought to
consist of conduct that is harmful. Jean Hampton, Retribution and the Liberal State, 5 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 117, 129 (1994). Even offenses that were once justified on the basis of the protection
of morality or virtue are now recast in terms of their “harmful” effects. Bernard E. Harcourt, The
Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 110 (1999).
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While moral diversity criminal law localism presents a threat to
liberalism, it may also present a threat to republicans. Republican
punishment theorists, building on the work of Philip Pettit, claim that
criminal law prevents “dominium”—the domination of private citizens over
another.172 However, they also aim to prevent “imperium”—the arbitrary use
of state power.173 Thus, republicans are not usually moralists, and aim at a
cultivation not of personal virtue, but of “civic virtue.”174 A republican
criminal law, then, ends up looking very much like a liberal criminal law, and
would view with suspicion pro-devolution claims rooted in moral diversity.
Localism for the purpose of maximizing viewpoints about state punishment
results in the threat of increased imperium.
But perhaps these criticisms would be shrugged off by many criminal
justice localists; if their localism is not grounded in liberalism or
republicanism, then the labels “illiberal” or “anti-republican” have little bite
to them. However, if this is their response, let us pause for a moment to
emphasize its implications. If criminal justice localists are willing to jettison
liberalism and republicanism when making pro-devolution claims, then they
are accepting a criminalization regime rooted in majoritarian popular
sovereignty that comes with all the well-known dangers of minority
oppression and moralism. Moral diversity localism, after all, seems
moralistic. And just as reduction in jurisdictional size gives greater power to
concentrated majority viewpoints, it hurts all the worse for the dissenters who
happen to live there. As I said before, there will always be “losers” in this
devolutionary scheme. We can be sure that the localizers discussed earlier
are all aware of these dangers, and also hope to guard against them. But the
burden is on them to explain what safeguards can be used to replace the
traditional safeguard of liberal neutrality.
Of all the democratizers, Kleinfeld is most keenly aware of the
potentially nefarious implications of a popular sovereignty theory of
criminalization. While arguing that a community should “see its norms
reflected in its [criminal] laws,” he responds to the objection of majoritarian
norm oppression by limiting his claims to certain types of communities and
by superimposing on those communities a tight boundary around the
acceptable realm of criminalization.175 Regarding the communities who can
172. Richard Dagger, Republicanism and the Foundations of the Criminal Law, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 44, 47 (RA Duff & Stuart P. Green ed., 2011)
(emphasis omitted).
173. Id. (emphasis omitted).
174. Id. at 66 (emphasis omitted) (“Republicans do want to make people better, in other words,
but they want to make them better citizens; and this means, among other things, that they want
people to be better observers of ‘the rules of toleration’ and the other liberal ‘ground rules’ that
Murphy takes to be necessary to the preservation of ‘individual moral autonomy.’”).
175. Kleinfeld, supra note 85, at 1456.
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reconstructively criminalize, it is only “decent” communities whose “ethical
life” also has “democratic authority”—meaning that its “values” were
“formed in reasonably non-oppressive conditions.”176 Thus, he stipulates that
his claims apply only to political communities that have managed to prevent
from occurring what both liberal and republican theory aim to prevent.177
Kleinfeld concludes that this may potentially “exclude from consideration all
communities with unjust cultures.”178 While he was not thinking of
devolution in the context in which he made these specific claims, one worries
that devolution and concentration of moral viewpoints may give
jurisdictional status to pockets of people that form non-“decent”
communities.179 Furthermore, Kleinfeld avoids the majoritarian norm
oppression problem by positing a minimalism in criminalization that the
majority may or may not agree to. His “moral culture principle of
criminalization” limits punishable conduct to the core of the traditional
criminal law: very serious “acts that violate and attack the values on which
social life is based,” and therefore are “fairly basic and widely
acknowledged” to be legitimate targets of state punishment.180 How can
popular sovereignty, once concentrated and liberated from substantive
constraints, be expected to limit itself in such a way? Again, the
superimposition of a substantive constraint on the majority will does the work
that liberalism and republicanism aimed to do.
The threat of oppressive local norms becoming ratified by law is not a
farfetched antiquarian concern more appropriate for the Victorian era—it is
always real, but manifests itself in different forms at different times.
Reducing jurisdictional size facilitates this ratification.
Consider the series of criminal “anti-sag[ging]” ordinances punishing
wearing one’s pants too low around one’s waist (in some cases with jail
time).181 These were enacted in the late 2000s—well after the end of

176. Id. at 1466 (emphasis omitted).
177. Kleinfeld states:
For a community’s ethical life to have democratic authority, that ethical life must be
consistent with the premise that the people who comprise society should command its
law. That premise necessarily excludes forms of ethical life based on one portion of
society oppressing, manipulating, denying equal citizenship to, or otherwise dominating
another portion of society. Democratic ethical life is thus necessarily limited to moral
cultures formed in reasonably free and equal conditions.
Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1456, 1458.
181. See Angelica M. Sinopole, Comment, “No Saggy Pants”: A Review of the First Amendment
Issues Presented by the State’s Regulation of Fashion in Public Streets, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 329,
331 (2008) (citing DELCAMBRE, LA., ORDINANCE 2007-04 (2007); MANSFIELD, LA., ORDINANCE
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Victorian moralism—and they were enacted by localities, not states.182
Indeed, in Louisiana a statewide offense was proposed in 2004 but failed to
become law.183 As reported by the Washington Post, “after that failed, cities
in Louisiana and beyond simply took up the cause themselves.”184 For a
proponent of such an ordinance in Atlanta (which did not pass), a Black city
councilman named CT Martin, “saggy pants represent[ed] the ‘prison
mentality’ and signif[ied] the poor social conditions and problems associated
with young black persons,” and he therefore “proposed the law in an effort
to resolve these social problems and improve ‘community standards.’”185 In
smaller jurisdictions like Shreveport, where such oppressive norms were able
to garner a majority of votes on the local legislature, these norms became
enforced by criminal law.186
Another moralistic local offense that seems teleported from a prior era
is a 2009 ordinance punishing the sale of “[a]ny device designed or marketed
as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs.”187 Created
by the City of Sandy Springs, Georgia, this offense was challenged in 2014
as unconstitutional by a disabled plaintiff who sought to use the devices to
facilitate sexual intimacy with her husband.188 The plaintiff lost at trial and
on appeal, but the case became moot once the city decided to repeal the
ordinance—a decision made only after the city learned that the case was
being reviewed by the en banc court.189 Examples like these teach us that the
threat of localistic moralism in criminal law remains a contemporary concern.
B. Liberty Maximizing Localism
A second major value of criminal justice localism is said to be the
enhancement of individual liberty.190 When jurisdictions are smaller, citizens
10 (2007); Atlanta, Ga., Proposed Ordinance 07-O-1800, § 106-13, Wearing of Pants Below the
Waist in Public, Unlawful (2007)).
182. See id.
183. Meagan Flynn, A ‘Saggy Pants’ Violation Led to a Fatal Police Chase. A Louisiana
Lawmaker
Wants
to
Repeal
the
Law.,
WASH. POST (May
30,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/05/30/saggy-pants-violation-led-fatal-police-chaselouisiana-lawmaker-wants-repeal-law/.
184. Id.
185. Sinopole, supra note 181, at 368–69 (citation omitted).
186. Id. at 369.
187. SANDY SPRINGS, GA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 38-120(c) (2009).
188. Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th Cir. 2017).
189. Id. at 1254.
190. This is similarly a value claimed of federalism, but the liberty-enhancing mechanism for
federalism is distinct. Federalism’s benefit is the checking power of two sovereigns, but localities
do not have sovereign status. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907). See
also Briffault, supra note 153, at 1322 (“Perhaps the strongest argument for federalism is that it is,
in Madison’s phrase, part of the ‘double security’—along with the separation of powers within the
national government—for liberty. Thus, federalism is said to provide ‘protection against abusive
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are expected to use the law against each other in less oppressive ways. The
lynchpin of the expected non-oppression is what may be called a
psychological claim: People feel empathy for people that are like them or that
they know, and they will act on this empathy when making political
decisions.191 Devolution of political authority, then, is an empathyempowering institutional structure which results in enhanced individual
liberty.
I am thinking here, of course, of the theories of Kahan and Meares as
well as Stuntz. Inner city residents, according to Kahan and Meares, “have
not renounced their concern for the very individuals who are, or who are
likely to become, criminal victimizers,” and they are therefore subject to
“competing pulls of interest and affection” due to “intimately
bound . . . social and familial ties.”192 These local citizens may therefore
choose the “new community policing” (of public order offenses) because
they view such criminal laws as “the least destructive” method of deterring
truly serious crime.193 These local citizens choose to mitigate criminal
justice’s potential “destructive toll” because of “[t]he pervasive sense of
linked fate” with defendants.194 Stuntz also observes the tension between
citizens’ “anger at crime and empathy for the young men whom police
officers arrest and prosecutors charge,” and concludes that this tension
produces moderation: “[B]oth forces are powerful, and they push in opposite
directions,” thus resulting in equilibrium and “moderate” or “lenient”
punishment policies.195 The institutional arrangement to “harness[]” this is
localism, the empathy-enabler.196

government.’ Moreover, as Akhil Amar has urged, the role of federalism as a check on the national
government may distinguish federalism from decentralization since, although most of the other
values of federalism can be obtained by decentralization in which the local units are legally
subordinate to the central government, the local units have to be legally autonomous in order to be
able to protect the people against central government tyranny.” (footnotes omitted)).
191. By “empathy” I mean the capacity of “understanding the experience or situation of another,
both affectively and cognitively, often achieved by imagining oneself to be in the position of the
other.” Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1579 (1987).
192. Kahan & Meares, supra note 3, at 1165.
193. Id.
194. Meares & Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural Thinking, supra note 30, at 210.
195. STUNTZ, supra note 37, at 35–36.
196. Id. at 36. Stuntz states:
Local political control over criminal justice harnesses both forces without giving
precedence to either. The balance between those dueling incentives looks different when
power over criminal punishment is given to voters and officials outside the communities
where crimes happen and punishments are imposed. Anger and empathy alike are weaker
forces when they come from voters who see crime on the evening news than when they
flow from voters’ lived experience.
Id. “Make criminal justice more locally democratic, and justice will be both more moderate and
more egalitarian.” Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1974.
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Will empathy-enabling localism increase individual liberty if the
localism devolves power over substantive criminal law? Kahan and Meares
were certainly thinking of criminalization devolution (despite including
criminalization under the banner of “policing”). Stuntz, however, never
directly discusses locally-promulgated offenses, and instead uses the jury as
the institutional mediator of localism (coupled with vaguer mens rea
elements).
Regarding the underlying psychological premise, there is important
recent work which undermines it. Jonathan Rappaport, in a direct criticism
of the Democratization movement, challenges the premise of “lay leniency,”
and in doing so provides evidence against the claim of “local” leniency as
well.197 Citing to the work of James Forman’s “now-famous account of
popular support for ‘tough on crime’ policies in majority-black Washington,
DC,”198 as well as studies demonstrating a similar phenomenon in New York
City,199 Rappaport concludes that “it is too simplistic to assume that ‘black
communities’ will reflexively push toward greater leniency in criminal
justice.”200 While Kahan and Meares would respond that such policies are
examples of local empathy, Rappaport’s evidence shows that local support
favors policies that would normally be thought of as harshly punitive—not
moderate or lenient.201 In other words, Kahan and Meares correctly identify
substantive criminal law as a policy preference of many inner city
communities, but they mistake the motivation behind it and the severity of
the policy outputs.
Next, in order to assess whether localism in criminalization would result
in more or less individual liberty, we need to be clear about our definition of
liberty. One would think that in the context of criminal justice, “liberty”
means an individual’s freedom from official coercion and abuse, as well as
freedom from state punishment. Thus, liberty here is the liberty of an
individual as oppositional to intrusions by state coercion. As the Supreme
Court wrote in the federalism context, “the Constitution divides authority
between federal and state governments for the protection of individuals.”202
One might add: protection of individuals from the two named governments.
197. John Rappaport, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI. L. REV.
711, 732, 736 (2020).
198. Id. at 788–89 (citing JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017)).
199. Id. at 778 (citing VANESSA BARKER, THE POLITICS OF IMPRISONMENT: HOW THE
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS SHAPES THE WAY AMERICA PUNISHES OFFENDERS (2009)). See generally
FRITZ UMBACH, THE LAST NEIGHBORHOOD COPS: THE RISE AND FALL OF COMMUNITY POLICING
IN NEW YORK PUBLIC HOUSING (2011).
200. Rappaport, supra note 197, at 791.
201. Id.
202. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992).
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If one adopts this standard conception of liberty, then one must conclude that
liberty is only diminished by increased devolution of criminalization power.
The nature of the creation of a criminal offense is that it restricts liberty both
(1) prospectively, by altering the conduct of law-abiding citizens that would
otherwise engage in the conduct but for the proscription; and (2) in the default
use of a carceral penalty for violation. Empowering a sub-state jurisdictional
entity—a locality—to promulgate more offenses in addition to those that
already exist at the state level therefore shrinks individual liberty (assuming
the locality will use its power) by expanding the realm of conduct that is
prohibited and that results in state carceral punishment.
Kahan and Meares are able to embrace the counterintuitive claim that
increased local criminalization also increases liberty, then, only by
introducing a very different conception of liberty. They agree with the basic
understanding of liberty as a function of “the number of options from which
individuals would otherwise be free to choose” in life, but argue that criminal
law’s effect on these options is not always to reduce them.203 Because of
“social norms,” many individuals will choose certain courses of action that
they do not actually want to pursue, and therefore “a law forbidding the normdriven conduct will have an ambiguous effect on liberty.”204 In other words,
liberty-maximizing localism should be concerned with private, non-official
forms of oppression, and criminal laws can thus be liberating. Even if we
accept that the phenomenon of social norms identified by Kahan and Meares
exists, is it really widespread enough to justify adopting their counterintuitive
version of liberty? It seems that such a limited observation205 should not
support a larger project of wholesale devolution of substantive criminal law.
Widely-resented social norms are surely not the general cause of antisocial
conduct, and therefore when asking whether devolution will be “liberty
enhancing on net,”206 it makes more sense to use the standard definition of
liberty and to apply a heavy presumption against criminalization.
C. Equality Localism
The promotion of equality—especially racial equality—is also a
prominent theme in the work of many of the criminal justice localists. It is
easiest to understand these egalitarian theories as derivative of claims
regarding localism’s effects on liberty and its facilitation of moral diversity.
203. Kahan & Meares, supra note 3, at 1181.
204. Id.
205. They make only a modest claim: Because “[m]any forms of inner-city criminality are fueled
by widely resented norms,” judges should be epistemically “humble” about the liberty maximizing
effects of invalidating local criminal laws. Id. at 1181–82. This claim on its face, then, is limited
to certain forms of criminality, and to those that occur in the “inner-city.” Id. at 1181.
206. Id. at 1182.
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Newly restrained use of criminal punishment in response to historically
excessive use (especially against Black people), has an equality payoff as
well as a liberty payoff. Similarly, concentrating the political power of
minority groups by reducing jurisdictional size creates equality. This is
mediated through the minority group’s newfound ability to erase unwanted
legal burdens but also to create new rules responsive to its preferences (moral
diversity).
The localistic equality-through-liberty argument is that of Stuntz.
Recall his prescription for reform:
[P]lace more power in the hands of residents of high-crime city
neighborhoods—for they feel the effects of rising and falling rates
of crime and punishment, just as shareholders feel the effects of
rising and falling corporate profits. Make criminal justice more
locally democratic, and justice will be both more moderate and
more egalitarian.207
The empathy-enabling effect of localism still does most of the work here, but
it has an equality-increasing effect. “[M]oderation and equality travel
together,” he writes, and “reinforce one another.”208
The localistic equality-through-power argument is that of Simonson. It
is a power to instantiate the moral viewpoints of a historically oppressed
community into the law that binds that community. With respect to power
over policing, she writes that “[t]he idea of power shifting is not inherently
abolitionist, or even left-leaning; community control, for instance, could be
an institution that people who want more policing take up in the name of
public safety.”209 This commitment to giving the people what they want,
though, is qualified by some outer bounds. Localism must enable powershifting that increases equality by empowering historically powerless groups:
“Our normative call, then, is not for localism-qua-localism, but rather for a
scholarly focus on concrete mechanisms of power-shifting in governance
toward the relatively powerless.”210
The egalitarian variants of localism, like the theories on which they are
based, are contestable. Consider them in turn.

207. Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1974; STUNTZ, supra note 37, at 311 (“The notion that
condemnation and punishment are essential but also dangerous comes most naturally to those whose
lives most resemble the lives of the criminal defendants who are subject to the justice system’s
justice. This is why the style of local democracy that governed much of America’s criminal justice
system for much of the nation’s past worked reasonably well . . . .”).
208. Stuntz, supra note 4, at 2031.
209. Simonson, supra note 15, at 809.
210. Rahman & Simonson, supra note 16, at 741 (footnotes omitted); id. at 741 n.273 (“To the
extent that we are entering the debate over the value of localism in the context of federalism, we
would also endorse a normative frame that places limits on localism to the extent that it bumps up
against values of equality and inclusion.” (citing Davidson, supra note 20, at 984–93)).
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First, Stuntz’s equality localism is premised on the same psychological
claim of empathy enablement as his claim about leniency, and as mentioned
above, it has been strongly criticized. Rappaport addresses this directly in
his assessment of Stuntz and the democratizers.211 “Blacks are far more
likely than whites to be victims of crime,” he writes, and therefore
“[u]nsurprisingly, research suggests that blacks are, on average, more fearful
of crime than whites are, and that blacks for whom crime is more salient are
more supportive of punitive measures that disproportionately burden black
offenders.”212 Rappaport notes that then-U.S. Attorney for Washington, D.C.
Eric Holder (a Black man) “blessed pretextual traffic stops as a tool to get
guns ‘out of the hands of young black men.’”213 Supporting Rappaport’s
point, it is worth noting that the “anti-sagging” ordinances described in
Section III.A were “proposed largely by African-American officials.“214
More insidious than the possibility of a self-directed punitiveness on the part
of the Black community is Rappaport’s objection that in mixed
neighborhoods—and this would be most neighborhoods—increased
diversity (say, through increased localism) might result in a punitive backlash
by whites who feel “threat[ened].”215 Since leniency and equality travel
together, if the psychological underpinning of the leniency claim is
undermined, so too is equality.
While Simonson does not deploy her version of egalitarian localism in
the realm of substantive criminal law, such an application would be
problematic. The egalitarian valence of localism’s downward power-shift
becomes counterintuitive when applied to criminalization. How would
allowing a neighborhood to create its own crimes result in greater equality
(especially racial equality)? Again, the peculiar nature of devolution over
substantive criminal law in the United States—the one-way rachet—means
that egalitarian goals would not be served by localism here. Further
empowering smaller and smaller jurisdictions to create more and more
misdemeanors seems to produce not more equality, but less. As Natapoff
demonstrates, a key feature of the misdemeanor system generally is that it
will disproportionately impact the poor, trapping them in a vicious cycle of
fines being due and fines being assessed for failure to pay prior fines (as well
as disqualification by conviction for money-earning opportunities).216 Even
211. Rappaport, supra note 197, at 786; see also Benjamin Levin, Mens Rea Reform and its
Discontents, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 491, 543 n.251 (2019) (critiquing empathy-based
arguments of Stuntz).
212. Rappaport, supra note 197, at 788 (footnote omitted) (citing studies).
213. Id. at 789 (internal citation omitted).
214. Niko Koppel, Are Your Jeans Sagging? Go Directly to Jail, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/30/fashion/30baggy.html.
215. Rappaport, supra note 197, at 798.
216. NATAPOFF, supra note 6, at 127–28.
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more fundamentally, it is hard to think of cases in which the criminalization
of new categories of conduct will ever advance equality. This would
certainly be the goal of civil rights and hate crimes, but these are outliers.217
One possibility is to conceive of the current state of inequality as a
problem of the discriminatory criminalization of conduct engaged in mostly
by out-groups. Many commentators view loitering offenses to be of this
nature. In the memorable words of Bernard Harcourt, the creation of “order
maintenance” offenses pursuant to “[B]roken [W]indows” theory turned the
“‘losers’ of society,” the “hoboes, bums, [and] winos,” from “losers” to
criminals.218 Concentrating the political power of the out-group in a smaller
local jurisdiction, though, will not remedy the existence of these offenses at
the state level; again, the only viable policy output is to create new crimes.
The only equality-enhancing option, then, would be to “level up” with respect
to punishment—for the newly empowered (formerly oppressed) group to use
its new political power to “remedy” its unequal treatment in the criminal code
by placing criminal law burdens on the newly disempowered (formerly
oppressive) group. Imagine a freshly drawn neighborhood jurisdiction
creating new misdemeanors aimed at punishing the populace that frequents
country clubs or plays golf, and all this in the name of equalizing the effect
of misdemeanors on marginalized communities.219 As Benjamin Levin
concludes (in another context), “the instinct to level or equalize up is a
dangerous one—rather than addressing substantive issues or working
towards a system in which all are treated well, it legitimates the exact same
abuses that are so objectionable when leveled against the marginalized
defendant.”220 The kind of egalitarianism criminal justice localists seek is a
decarceral, de-managerial egalitarianism, which creates equality by leveling
down the excessive and disproportionate punishment of marginalized
communities. This goal is illusory if the means to achieve it is localism in
substantive criminal law.

217. Perhaps it might be said that discriminatory under-enforcement of the law (say, with white
teenagers and marijuana possession) might be remedied by increasing enforcement across the board,
and therefore equality, but this is a claim about enforcement and not the content of substantive
criminal law.
218. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING 185 (2001) (“And the principal justification is no longer offense nor
immorality but harm—the harm that these misdemeanor offenses cause.”).
219. I use this example as an activity that is overwhelmingly engaged in by suburban white
people. “American golfers are 77 percent male and 80 percent white, according to the 2015 Golf
Diversity & Inclusion Report.” Michael Cottman, Golf’s Lack of Color: Finding More Brown for
the Green, EBONY (Nov. 15, 2016), https://www.ebony.com/news/golf-diversity/.
220. Levin, supra note 211, at 543 (emphasis omitted).
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D. Experimentation Localism
A fourth justification for localism is grounded in the notion of localities
as efficient “laboratories” of policy experimentation.221 This argument is
premised on the value of having multiple jurisdictions working toward
solving the same problem or reaching the same goal; it implies devolution
because devolution allows for a multitude of jurisdictions, as opposed to a
single jurisdiction with a uniform approach not amenable to experimentation.
This presupposes that policy innovations will usually not create maximally
optimal results on their first iteration and will inevitably need revision.
Moreover, it seems to assume that localities will learn from each other’s
experiments—that they will “compare notes.” The genesis of this argument
is thought to be Justice Bradeis’s dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann:
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave
responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught
with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.222
Scholars help to elaborate this claim, writing that devolution
“promote[s] the efficiency of government administration.”223 In the context
of criminal law, Susan Klein writes, “[localism] seeks to preserve local
control of the criminal-justice system and to foster diversity and
experimentation that might improve efficiency in areas where there is
[widespread] agreement as to general goals, though perhaps not as to the best
means for achieving those goals.”224 Klein’s formulation adds important
precision—experimentation localism is normally invoked to allow for interjurisdictional experimentation with respect to the means of achieving shared
goals.225 This is not localism for the sake of diverse viewpoints on policy

221. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
222. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
also Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536–37 (1968) (“[F]ormulating a constitutional rule would
reduce, if not eliminate, that fruitful experimentation, and freeze [it] . . . into a rigid constitutional
mold.”); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 283–84 (1980) (observing that “[p]enologists themselves
have been unable to agree” on appropriate punishments, and that in this context of “uncertainty,” it
was the place of the “legislatures” (plural) to continue experimentation).
223. Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-à-Vis the States: The Dispensability of
Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1614 (1977).
224. Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1541,
1541–42 (2002) (footnotes omitted). Klein’s statement is taken from a discussion of the values of
federalism, but it is equally applicable to localism, and the argument is often used in that context.
225. As Barry Friedman writes, “[c]ountless state and local governments, remote from one
another but facing similar problems, develop numerous twists on solving them.” Friedman, supra
note 157, at 399–400.
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goals or ends (that would be the “moral diversity localism” discussed
earlier).226
Of the criminal justice localists, Natapoff’s endorsement of this version
of experimentation localism is most explicit. Recall the end of her book,
where she writes that “many misdemeanor changes will of necessity be
bottom-up, driven by local residents, advocates, and public officials.”227 This
is a cause for optimism: “The beauty of localism . . . is that it offers enormous
room for creativity and experimentation . . . . In the misdemeanor world,
every . . . municipality can launch its own experiment.”228
Consider also Rahman and Simonson’s description of cities as places
that can “innovate and experiment with” both “substantive policies” and also
“processes and strategies for power-shifting.” 229 They update Brandeis’s
outdated metaphor of a laboratory for our Silicon Valley age: “Cities, on our
read, are vital in part as incubators for new democratic practices and
strategies.”230
Now that we understand the theory of localism grounded in the value of
experimentation, we are able to assess how well this comports with theories
of criminal law. Should the power to criminalize conduct be given to smaller
jurisdictions in the expectation that experiments in criminalization will
produce better or more efficient criminal law outputs in the long run? I think
the answer should be “no,” and I base my opposition on the crucial
assumption of this theory that rules and policies are made on a tentative basis
with the expectation that some will fail. My claim is that tentativeness is
incompatible with legitimate state punishment.
Tentative state punishment, a key premise of criminal law localism
rooted in the value of experimentation, contemplates deliberate use of
criminalization in potentially erroneous or sub-optimal manners so that
jurisdictions as a group can make progress by “comparing notes.” It is the
one laboratory that demonstrates success that should then be emulated, but
what of those that failed in their experiments? Perhaps this would be
acceptable with zoning regulations or taxation policies, but we should not
accept it with punishment. The distinctive features of the criminal sanction
set it apart as an inappropriate area for experimentation. As Joel Feinberg
wrote almost sixty years ago, state punishment involves “hard treatment”

226. See infra Section III.A.
227. NATAPOFF, supra note 6, at 226.
228. Id. at 226–27. I am not alone in drawing this conclusion. Consider Judge Bibas’s review
of the book. Bibas, supra note 10, at 1041.
229. Rahman & Simonson, supra note 16, at 741.
230. Id.
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(such as incarceration or fines), but also an expression of “ritualistic
condemnation” with “symbolic conventions.”231
Experimentation seems especially inappropriate as a basis for doling out
hard treatment. The primary form of hard treatment in the United States is
incarceration, and liberty deprivations seem to be impossible to compensate
post hoc after it is admitted that an experiment has “failed.” They are
irrevocable acts. The intuitive disgust one feels when thinking of discrete
monetary payments to those wrongfully imprisoned for many years helps
illustrate this. Were hard treatment on the basis of experimentation limited
to fines, this would be less problematic. However, the misdemeanor
literature demonstrates that even when an offense cannot carry a carceral
sentence, “the process . . . is the . . . punishment”—lost time and energy due
to procedure hassle cannot be repaid.232
The experimental use of state punishment’s condemnatory aspect is
even more problematic than hard treatment: It almost seems conceptually
impossible. Returning to Feinberg, state punishment communicates an
“[a]uthoritative [d]isavowal” of the conduct.233 One would think that implicit
in the symbolic meaning of an “authoritative” disavowal is that the decision
to condemn the conduct is a considered conclusion made after a
determination that the conduct must be condemned—in other words, that it
is not a tentative decision. This is not to say that criminal law must be ossified
once enacted, but instead that at the time of the enactment the community
and its representatives must intend for permanence; deliberate tentativeness
by officials, I think, deprives the communication of its authoritative
condemnatory stigma. Consider how shamed this defendant would feel: At
sentencing, the judge informs him that he is being punished for conduct that
the locality tentatively believes is antisocial, but that it may revise this
conclusion in the future based on a study of other localities. The judge
reassures the defendant that the effort is in service of a longer-term goal, and
that even if he was erroneously condemned, he contributed to the larger
effort. I would think that this admission of tentativeness substantially
deprives the communication of its condemnatory aspect.
All this is to say that experimentation and state punishment are in
tension. The lab rat in the failed vaccine trial would find little consolation, I
think, in knowing the circumstances of his sacrifice. Yet experimentation
localism in criminal law treats human beings like lab rats. Of the various
mainstream theories of state punishment, perhaps only one would endorse
such a justification: a thoroughgoing utilitarian theory. Of course,

231. Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 400 (1965).
232. FEELEY, supra note 91, at 199.
233. Feinberg, supra note 231, at 404–05.
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experimental use of punishment for long term utility gains brings to mind the
familiar objection of the sacrifice of the innocent.234
Woe to those who were subject to a failed criminal law experiment, and
history is replete with such examples. One might conceive of the local
criminalization of baggy pants235 (discussed earlier) to be an “experiment” in
whether fashion regulation can be a determinant of “community standards”
of conduct more generally.236 After a decade of experience with these types
of ordinances, though, some communities have eliminated them. Opa-locka,
Florida, abolished its thirteen-year-old anti-sagging ordinance in late 2020
after the city council determined that it had racially disproportionate
effects.237 Shreveport, Louisiana, abolished its ordinance in 2019 after
twelve years; the city’s data indicated that “Black men made up 96 percent
of the 726 arrests for sagging in Shreveport since the law passed 2007.”238
These localities, it appears, viewed their innovative offense to be a failed
experiment—one that did more harm than good. The hundreds of Black men
arrested, jailed, and fined during the experiment, though, have no remedy to
make them whole. Indeed, in one incident a police encounter triggered by
the Shreveport ordinance led to the death of the fleeing suspect in a
shootout.239 Criminal law “experiments,” after all, always unholster the
deadly power of police by justifying interactions with citizens, even if the
penalty in the ordinance is itself minor.
Consider another more widespread failure in the history of American
criminal law: the experimentation with the criminalization of sex work.
While perhaps originally supported for moralistic reasons, with the decline
of moralism in criminal law these offenses are now defended on the basis of

234. See generally Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment
of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 115 (2000) (describing and critiquing the objection).
235. See supra notes 181–186 and accompanying text.
236. Sinopole, supra note 181, at 368–69.
237. Richard Luscombe, Florida City Ends Anti-Sagging Saga with Move to Allow Low
Trousers, GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/sep/14/floridacity-sagging-low-trouser-opa-locka-barack-obama (“In a 4-1 vote, commissioners in Opa-locka
acted to strike the original regulation, and a 2013 amendment extending the ban to women, from its
statute book. Officials in the majority-Black city said the move was meant to increase equality. ‘I
was never in support of it, even as a resident,’ Vice-Mayor Chris Davis, one of five city
commissioners who are all Black, told the Miami Herald. ‘I felt it disproportionately affected a
certain segment of our population, which is young, African American men.’”).
238. Sara MacNeil, Sagging Pants Law Abolished in Shreveport, SHREVEPORT TIMES (June 11,
2019, 6:03 PM), https://www.shreveporttimes.com/story/news/2019/06/11/sagging-pants-lawabolished-shreveport/1425135001/.
239. Flynn, supra note 183 (“For weeks, residents have stormed city council meetings
demanding answers to one unshakable question: How did a man’s loose shorts lead to a fatal police
encounter?”).
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the purported harm to the female sex worker.240 With protection of sex
workers now the primary justification for criminalizing their work,
jurisdictions are now experimenting with how best to accomplish that end—
some punishing the sex worker themself (in the name of deterrence), others
punishing only the “Johns” (the “Nordic Model”), and others choosing
different variations.241 However, as time passes, experience shows that the
traditional as well as the Nordic Model both carry with them too many
counteracting harms to outweigh any larger benefit.242 In some sense, then,
experimentation has achieved its desired result of identifying non-ideal
policy options. However, in the decades it has taken to come to this
conclusion, vast amounts of harm—incarceration, managerial control,
policing, and surveillance—have been imposed on the same sex workers who
were intended beneficiaries of the criminal offense’s protection.243 If all
criminalization models are finally abandoned by all jurisdictions, it will be
impossible not to look back on this as a mistake, and as illegitimate state
punishment.
CONCLUSION
Scholarly frustration with the state of American criminal justice is at a
high point. When one considers the crisis of racialized mass incarceration,
of deadly and discriminatory policing, and of the phenomenon of managerial
social control through the misdemeanor process, one can be excused for
thinking that big-picture, systemic change is needed. One thread running
throughout this frustration is the thought that an invigorated localism would
be a major part of the solution.
The goal of this Article is to demonstrate that this would not be true of
localism in substantive criminal law. Because of foundational principles in
local government law, themselves enshrined in state constitutions and their
240. See Harcourt, supra note 171, at 147 (discussing shifting justifications for criminalization
of sex work).
241. “Three primary legislative responses to prostitution have emerged in response to these
commitments: (1) criminalization, (2) legalization/decriminalization, and (3) the Nordic model.”
Ane Mathieson, Easton Branam & Anya Noble, Prostitution Policy: Legalization,
Decriminalization and the Nordic Model, 14 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 367, 368 (2015).
242. See I. India Thusi, Harm, Sex, and Consequences, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 159, 166 (2019)
(advocating for decriminalization of sex work by “consider[ing] the harms that [result from] this
class of sex workers’ experiences from any form of criminalization, including partial
criminalization”); Rachel Marshall, Sex Workers and Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of Laws
Regarding Sex Work, 23 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 47, 60 (2016) (discussing debate about
efficacy of Nordic Model).
243. See Thusi, supra note 242, at 206–07 (discussing harms of criminalization); Chelsea
Breakstone, “I Don’t Really Sleep”: Street-Based Sex Work, Public Housing Rights, and Harm
Reduction, 18 CUNY L. REV. 337, 354 (2015) (discussing local NYC offenses covering sex work
and deleterious collateral consequences relating to public benefits and housing).

1164

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:1119

judicial interpretations, criminal law localism carries with it a necessarily
pro-criminalization valence. Facilitating the growth of a subterranean body
of local misdemeanors will not promote the values that criminal justice
localists cherish—it will counteract them. Localism with respect to the rules
of criminal procedure (especially policing and prosecution) may be more
promising, but when calling for such devolution localists should be explicit
that their devolutionary program excludes substantive criminal law.

